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ORlPTER I
BA.SIO PBILOSOPBIOAL PRINOIPLES

A.. LID AID

womm

Oharles Rartsho.rne _s born 111 Xi t'ta:rm1Q. Penns71Yat1ia, on
31m. 5, 189'1, and .reoeiYed h1s ec1:noation at B'aYel'iol'd 0011886,

PemuJylYa1l1a, and Ranud t1zl1yel's1 ty, whel'Q he reoeiYed his dooto.m.l dea.ree 1n philosoph)' in 1923.

lIe taught at the UnlTe.rslty

of Ohicago f.rom 1928 to 1955, and 8il'loe that time has been teaohing at Emory UniYel'sity,A.tlanta.
Among h1s wl'1 tinge

81'S

inoluded seyen books. oontributions to

mol'e than half a dozen othe.rs. and ntUnel'OUS articles in the lead-

ing l'e1181ou8 and philosophioal .,cn.rna.ls. l

His philosophioa.l

Wl'i tings al."e desoribed 07 Andl'ew J. Reck tn these te.rms:
lH.s ftl'st book, The Ph110S0l>~ and PSlohOlOl1 of Sensa.tion,
i1'1tl'oduoes into 'Pi'Yc1io:t:08ioa~tlieorl pitnelp eTo! eon:Uliuity aDd aesthetio feeling espoused by the new metaphysios
in the philosoph" of ma.thematios and of natu.re. and the
upshot is the noyel dootrine of the afteotive oontinuum.
RaJ.ttshome's aext book. Beio.d mtman1mn, aJmOUlloes the mevement as "·a ,enuln8 intes.ra1:ono! .&1:1 ille modern motifs"
oulm_tins in a new th&01087. whioh he deSignates "theistio
Jl8tu.ralisll 01' attu'alistio theism," ad. which he p.reeeDte
in cont.rast with and in opposition to its Bl'eat oontempo.rUJ/ .rival. "non-theistio" hUm&lllsm. JIall's Vision of God
tmde.r'tabs to fOl'mulate the logio 01 iSe new iliel•• and to
demonst.rate its superiorit, to the olassioal spthesls of
•

Ili

!see the bibllograph7 at the endot this thesis.
1

2

Thoas Aquinas. In these works Hartshorne e::rpounde 8 metaph1sios of panpsyohlsm and be also SUSgests what he su.bsequently develops mOJ!'e fully as a tbeology of panentheiem.
In his Terry Leotu.res at Yale later e::rpanded and published
as The D1v1neBelatlT1tl. Hartshorne 81'stemtioally formulates'tlie panen!Ee!sil:e ooncaptlo11 of de1ty, a oonoept10n
whioh owes muoh to Vlb1 tehead. Then. 1n Phl1osoEhere
of God, Oharles Hartshorne, in jOint auUldislilp wIth n
...
lam'"11'iese. presents and disousses all the impoJ!'tant possible oonoeptio:as of dei t1 t argulng in the oOmJn6llts md in
the opening &11d oonolud1ng ohapteJ!'s for the Talldl ty of
pa:u.entheism. 2

sqiJ

.1. his latest book. The 1:2810

!!

PeJi,feo,tl on, 3 Hartshorne presents

several ]).roofs for the existence of God and reprints of some of
Us ma.re important joul'nal articles fl'om reoent years.
0U.r oritioal investigat10n of Hartshorne's thonght will und-

ertake to expla1l1 his fUlldamental philosophical poal tions It to outline his oonooption of God. and to oriticise oe.rte.iIl pOints in hls

pl:d.losopb;v.

Th1sfirst ohapter deals wlth Bartshornets oonoeption of

philosoph1 and its method of prooedure, as well as with his own
baslc philosophr. panpsyohism.
B. OOlfOEPnO!l OF PHILOSOPHY

V/hat ls metaph.:vs1os? Hartshorne giTes two answers, the first
of whioh Sa1'8 that :1 t seeks the most general featu.res of phenomena
ZAmAN. J. Reok, "The PhilosophY of Oha.rles Ra.rtshome," studles 1D Vi1li'tehead'a Philos0i!'!Z (l,l'Ulane Studies in Phl1osoEP.l. vo!.
%; lew O.r!eans It Tu"!aae11lilv era1 ty, !g~l '. pp. 9tr-'9!.
30harles Hartshorne, The ~JSio ~ Perfeotion (LaSalle, Ill.,
Open O'ourt Publishing Co •• ""1116~ •

and of th1ngs.4: Both natural solenoe and mathems.tios stand in
contl'a.st to it.
Natural science seeks speciel truths;5 it soaks to "general-

lae tha details so as to arrivo at the total system of detalls
whioh distinguishes the aotual wol'ld in this coamio epooh, a giant
detail in the e1au'Ml procession of world systemih" & The ob.&rao'er1stle mark of natuzal solence is tbat 1t specialises the lener10 t1'&lt8 of hu.man G:lpel'lellOe.

~

phenomel'101oS7, wi tll the ob3eot

of predlotlDl "he details Ol' speoialisations of future Ctll'pG.rienoe.'
For Tel'lfloatloa of 1t8 statements, atteJ1tlon to sease data is al3.lmpol'tu:'_ 8
lIetaph,Jsice
of ph.D..._

01'1

the othel' hand eeeks the moe t se.l'al t.rai ts

"as J'lelded by abstl'aotion fl'om all 1mag1nabll va.r1 ...

able details of expel'ienoe. ,,9

The alm of metaphyslos is not to

predict. but to .relate us "oonsciously to the outlines and the
4ohal'lee Ra.rtshoZ'll8. Befond ~_ (Ohioago &1'1d New YoZ'lt,
Willett, Ola.rk, and 00 •• l§'$ ). p~. !6S. ' •

5:rbld., p.

~6'.

Gz,bl,d,.. p. 268.

-

'Ibld.

axlld*. p. 267: l'For knowledge of speoial tru1;hs, the
sought D phySiCS, sense.data are all-impol'tant." See also

k1nd
p. 268:
"Ill utural science verification 1s effeoted by attentioJ1 to dotails of experience •."

ilbld.,

pp. 269-270.

pezman••t aspects ot e%1st8n08;"10 In oontrast to Datural solenoe,
1t generalises on the generl0 tra1ts of human exper1enoe, in order
to beoome aware of the galleria characteristics of all actual. and
possible obJeots ot experielloe. l1

The Terlflcatioll of metaphyslc-

al statemellts is effected by "attentlon to

tl's.l ts, e.
n

g..

experienoe's

genel'1c

memory. an1iioipat1on, des1.re. y!:vl(lness, disoord." 12

the vaguer pheno__ of emot1on, more or less oonsolCllsmEuBor1,

dim alttloipatloll, aesthet1c harmony and discord." 13
But mthematlcs also treats of the SSllRio i.ra1is of all rea...
11ty.14 How 18 it d1sttnguished from a.tap~vs1os'
There are two tlpes of generio ira1 tEn a) .. those whioh

Gall 1Jl

prino1ple ,or in the1r fbi te aspe ota, be acourately d1agr8.llfl8d in
s1lDboll0 sets.1t
and

fU'8

OBly these oan be perfectly

~leaJ.' &lld

ae,flnl te,

such beoause of the ab.ru.pt oOlltrasts of sensory qual 1tles.

Mathe. tios deals with this type of gGlleric t.rai ts.
b) Tnlts whleh Itue inoapable of symboll0 embodime1'lt of this

Ileat and definlte kind," whioh ounot be who111 clear or wholl.1
con&lst8llt ln thell' tm&1'11ngs beoause they form the OOJltlnuOtls aslotb,d., p. 268.
111"14 •
121b14,_

l3]:bid •• p. 26'7.
14Ibld., p. 2'73.

peot of expezienoe.

They form the province of metpjpbysios.15

Metaphysios thus treats of the non-mathematloaJ ganerlo
tl"aits of all objeotsof e:rparienoe.

There e..re two distlnot steps

in its p.rooedu.res the phenomenologioal lnqUlz:.v. or ths searoh for
generio tnl ts, and the drawing out of oonsequencee from the
t.ralta dlsoOTezed and deflned.

A ,ene.rl0 t.rai1: ls neoess&rily exemplified in any possible
expel"ienoe, 00U'f8ra817, 8xpel"ienoe ls not possible if the generic
tatt. a.re not exemplified in it.

!lo establish whioh t.t-alts are

generic. we _at ask. "Is expe.rlenoe possibl.e if this ualt is not
exempl.ified in 1t,..

_mary is taken as am .mmple: "No one will

dany that he knows what ls meant bV a memozy wi th othe.r quanti tatlYe features than the human, 8uoh as longer
gl"eate.r or less vividness.
oases.

Ol."

mortel" span,

!hese features are giTen as speolal.

But 1.f we tr;, to genel"alise be70lld memo,ry altogether, we

flnd ow selTes in eo nt l' ad 10 1:1 on wi th the g1yen. " l'

Gene.ral1.1ins

beltond memo.ry oauses the tani ty of time to dlsa.rpea.r; but beoause
theun1 t7 of time is eVldent. memoJ'Y must be a sene.rl0 t.r&1t of

all expGrS.enoe.

othe..l' t.ralte oan be put to the same test: it

thel.t- ab ••noe from experienoe makes expel"ienoe impossible. tbey

ue genul0 trld t8 of alle:xpe.t-lenoe.
lSOf. 1:t»1..4•• f pp. 2'13-274.
161bl4,_ • p. 2'11.

l"1b&d.', P. 2'12.

6

Onoe the sen.zlG 1;.ra11;8 of phenomena.

O!'

·oatego.rlee,,,18ha.ve

be.n d180ove"84. "the Ha' 18 a _t1;81' of a.cluotion t.rom det1m.-

tiona which attempt to state the 1nte.r.relat1ona of eatego.rles exhilt!'.' 1I1t_ phenomena_ w19 The metaphy8ioiam attempts to explioate the btell1g1bl11 t7 lm,pl101 t in the defin1 tlol'l8 gathe.red In-

dtlotlYe17 in the phenomenOlogloal lnquuy. oz, b1 aUt&&' \Yo.rds, to
analy•• GO~.Pt .. 20
Jla.ftQe.rne'$

seoon4 anewe!' to, "Qat te metaphyelGe'l" ls that

" . .tap~8108 studies non-reet.riotlvw
.A.

ax1etentlal attlrDatlons."21
purthl17 .re.ulotin atatemG!l.t of the aletentlat 'Jpe atf1rma

the exlst• •_ of

0_ th1l1B~.

but :11'1

80

dolns exolude. the .cd.stenoe

of Qothe.r; for: o:nmple. "'!hen are men in the .room' denies that
the .room 18 filled 80114

all4

'f"1'8 ..... DO

t1*OJn

floo.r to oel11as with wheat 0"'- sand;

Ilea 11'1 the .room' aff1.t'me that en.r,. nbetantl&l

part of the .ro_ .ontaln8 80118thtq (If oDl7 all', o.r a 'Yaotmm'

f1.tmlsJd.nB 'bee paBs..ge to r&d iant enel-S7) othel' than
l

I

I

.1.

ran: 22

11

.A.

•

18of. iill.., p. 2'10: "!be moet sene.ral. phenomena 1n this sense
oat••o.rl.s. such aa .relation, tJrl.na. ohaD.se.
&0'aa11t7_ ••• "

aft

ph11os0~1

1'J~&4"t p. 2'11.
2Otb14. I ••• aleo BeL9A1q of Pe.rfeot1e. p. Ilt "I q.ree
with Lel1illB tlJt.t ..tap ·sl'iirJ.'i
a tuenlon of the 10Sl.oa1 atftotue of oomepts, anA that .the.tloal _thod 18 the
'eobloal ke7.1f

ii..m,mr;;

lloh&rl.. Ira.rtahoftl8," )fe tap:tqe leal statemcmts as Non-Rest.rlotl" am! EXSatenUal," Be!!e" !! .. ta:el!l8!~aJ 12 (1958). p. 36.

22D1!_. P. 35.

,
0_p1e1817 l'eaul0 tiva sta.tement," on the othe.r h,uul. nit wes that
all7 8xlstent1a1 possi.bllltl is .rea11.64,·,23 &8. 'lor example. ".10-

th1ns &%1at8." But a whollJ' non-l"Gst.rlotlft statement exolu4es

I2'JaiDI

f.rOJl eJflatello•• "(t~oe:p' bare 'noth1ns' itself."S4

SUe a

statement 18 lISometld.l38 e$'s."
How 40 ,.. bow " statement 1s wholly !lon-net.tiott.ve? Hrat,
11; oannot be fals1fied. .. • Som tM.l'ls .:riB 'a' 1. in nooonoe1Table

oil'oumstanoea ta181tlable. alnoe the fa1s1t7il1B experience woUld
haTe to gist'.

am

1t w_14

al~ haYe

to be the Ql8.rlenoe

!!

eoreWlI8 e:d.stlng.1I8S Seool'1if. tM Rolli' nOZl-.reaU1otl,.e etate.
meld 18 ven.flable, "But though 'SOIII thlD8 818 tat 18 tmtalcd,fia'bl~.

1" 18

TG..rl.fled.

eTar,; moment_"

Whol17 :rum...reet.rlotlft ulsten:tial etstemeJlte are neoesS&.r7.

for the7 exolude notJdne from u1stel:.c'& aDd _n be faletti.a.

ncthl:ns.

b~

fDa "bel.r "t.ruth is neut.nl to .3,1 ubtenttel. alte.. -

na1d:res,,, an« this neutnl1t,. is preoiaely the tletlnS.tlon td. neo-

...
a~b'4.
2~.~ ». H. see aleo aharles Hartshomet. ,,Jleta>>h7s108
and the . . &J.lt7 of Exietential Ju.4smemt.... f_. aeAePDoe of
~t• • ea. %"0" Le,Ole.ro (London. Ge-re rrTen an1iii"tn;' I'n
Gif, iid.llarl.. 1961)'. p. 111. ,. ft.e,re are, then. three JIlO4al
to.rma ot e:d.stsnt1a1statementl thoee wIlloh contradiot fIft~7 poeitt:" e:d.sten1d.a1 &88.....tl01'11 thoae .111011 oontl'adloi so_ poeltl"
exi.etelltilll aa_..tions but 88fte W1 th othe.r8; thoee whloh Gontndlot no 811011 aaae.rtlons."
2&.ra.rteho.rae:, "lfetaph1Bloal state.nte

and E%1etenttal... p. 3&.

&8

lfon-Rest.r1otlve

8

.8alt7_
Mathemat10s als. studles who117

non-~strlotlye

_.t

atatements,

but onl.7 thoae of the llonexlatentla1 yarlet", it .xplo.re. p08s1b1l1ti8., "hUe meta:pb'e1os

1;.I'18S

of exlstenoe have 1n ooaon,"

01'

t. -express

all posslbilities

"the s"1'10t17 =i,. .. 8&1 features

of exlet81d;1a1 posslblll '7. those w]d,oh oaxmot 'be une:rempllfied.
~h...

WO oOl'lOeptlOl18 of metapQsloe are not oppoae4 to e aoh

othel's aooo.r41DS to botb, metaph7810a seeu the most p-.ral &lld
'IUllye..aal oha.l'aotez1etloe of expe,rlenoe, *loh cluaraoterlnlos are
neoeeeari.l7 e:rempl1tlea 1l'l 8,.e.r'l experlenoe.

a.eYez, alnoe . .

e:l'p110.1' torJalatlon ot these wo oomeptione 411f8.1'S, thell' e:rplloit, to.l'Sllatea oonol1l81one ale. 41ffe".

o.

ne

BlRTSBORIE' S PAllPSlOBtSll

p.nGanologlGal lDquU7 ot

.e

fJrst ....mrmtloned ool'lOep-

tloll of phllOSopiq 'bes1na w1 til the o'bse1'ftt10n that .ere aea to

be b. ,Hat olasaes ot th112la: o1-,.a_. and thlnss tbat are not
GrIan1alft8. a,

e.

abl••• • as ••

t..

th1qs of

ft.. the eeuoh tor ,ene.rl0 t.nlts, 01- "ooSJDlo ftl"1-

to be blooted at tllt yftl., nut b1 a 410hoto. 121

OU

e:rpe.rlenoe.

But at thl. p011'1t a wot!!!ala 1s l11tzoduoed.
26xbld •• pP. 36-37.
a 7JJartshO.nte.. B,ez~nd. ~n1am. p. 111.

280t. &b&4.• ,

p. 112.

• Theft are

,
good l"ea.sone. howevez. for think1ng that the lnozga.n1sans a..re simply aggregates at )jans whioh s..t'e themselves .. ganisma ... 29

The

elements of inorganic things exhibit activit1es analogous to those
of organio things.

The un1ve.t'se itself is "ozgantsed" b1 the unt-

ve.rsal laws of natu.re and i" thus slm1lar to an o.rgan1c th1ng.

These obsel'VStions allow

U8

to say that 1 t 1s at leut a .reason....

t

e;ble Yin that all thlll8s are in some way o.rga.n1o.

Hartshorne states biB

~o,hesis

in these tezma: theze seem

to be two classes of enstents; howeve.r, let us call 1no.rga.nlc
things

8fU5~esate8,

else which

and call organic things, as well an anythinS

1"eseJl?ble~

the o.t'ganlc, inti'Vidual,s.

Then, insofar as

th1llgs ue inti1 v1duals .rather than aggregates, thel will all fall

on a single scale, the organic scale. 30
But what doee 1 t Dean to be orsanlo?

What ""'tables apply to

eve.rytMng on 'this 80a16' FlI'st. we notice that "the most obvious
feature at the 80&1e is increasing oomplex1 t7 of spat1o-tempo.ral
st.rnctUt'e."31 Seoond, we notice that over part of the soale,
there is an increasing complexity of psyoholOgio2l st.ruotnre. 32
Third, we notioe that spatlo-tempo.ral oomplexity 1s Nsardeil as a
slgn of psyohological oomplexity; that ls, the two t3'pGs of comr,

29.Ibld.
_

•

T• •

300f. ibS:d,a t p. 112.

31~..l~1,~.• , p. 115.
32f J>ld.. p. 116.

10
ple:rit1 are c01"1"elatlve.

Tho natural question 1s then. "Oan the

psrChological variables be extended

OTe~

the whole

soe~a'

Oan we

p.redloate p81ohologloaloharaotel."istlo8 of all things 1nsofar as
tbq

&1"e

indlylduals?"

The anaveJf. whioh both tells

and at tJB

saJte·

lU3

what it

me811S

to be orgarJ.o

time attempts to Just ify panPS1ohS.sm. falls into

two pa.rtsl 1) P870h010810al variables

o,~ be thus extended

things: a) tmJ.ess we p,otually 40 thiS, oertain

~eas

to All

cf the soale

1"emaln impenet1"able mJsterles. 33
1) !At

118

taltethe variable "memo.r:t' for an e:rample.

I

t8

in-

ttl'll te extension both in l"egard to span and oomplex11:1 ls conceiv-

ab le. 34

01" let

lUI

conaid at" "feeling" = its int ansi tlT. or vB.l'la t 1 0

ot intensity. is potentiall,. infinite.

~

same holds true .regar-

ding its 't"aguemse o.r olarity.sa Beoat'lSe theae and other psyoho-

logioal TMiablea oan bave an lntin1te n1ll'!ibe.r of forms, 1t is
poe slb 1& 1I1&t8Ve1"1 ln4,.vi thtal possesses some to.rm ot th&m. 36
33Ib14.
.. ...

340f. ~bi4~. pp_ 116-117.
3ts:19..llJ.._ t p. 118.
a~f. pp. 119...120: "Thus the. main 1"8.rlables of peycbol(8)1
a.re of· . ~ted b1"ea4th o.r flenb 111')1_ Benoe 1 t 113 bluff and not
al"gument to .rejeot the pS7ohl0 lnt e.rp.retatlon of the scale of belngs on tbt g.raa.nd that. th1al:nte.rp.retatlon ls 'anth.ropomo.rphic, ,
for 1t is p.reclsely in its psychlc tl'Jakeup that a being oan be int,U,l.i te~ othe.r than -.n. The values of psychlc va.rlables whloh are
use '61 panpsyohlem to int e.rpl'ot the subanlme.l a.n.d tbe supe.rhtn.nan
areyalUfUl .realised in man. Those who say psychic concepts are too
n.a.rrow toapp11 to all the unlverse are not thinking of these con-

II

2} "The second ground for using tho payohologleal variables
over th" whole soala of beings 1s that there s.re no other 'Variab.

les. ff3'1

The only competl tor B:l.rtshcrne considers is the ftl"iables

employed in physios; but those tell us oIlll what .relatl0.Ils th1ngs

u:ve to eaoh other, not What thlngsa.re. 38
Ra.,rtshorne expla.1ns further wbJ ps;vohoJ.ogi3al variables ec
be the onl; variables with universal applioation.

-

All 1&riablea

mIlst be va..rlablea of' h11m!ll experience; we oan oonoeive of lilffe.renGes bS,tlyeGll this &:rpsr lance and tba t, but thel's 1tt no meaningful

oontrast between 'a"ha. t is expe.r lanced s.rA wlm t 113 simply not expel'All we knOl/il is hwoo.n experience.

it'Ulced.

Generall.r:ir.g beyond

thAt :means to genGralize away knowleltse.
On

~tshol'ne' s ~vpothesls.

tben, that some set of T&riables

is cosmo'. and taking into oonsideration, ashe doaa, only the yar-

ia.bles used 111 psyohology and in plljslce flnd l"oduoiIl8 the lo.tte.r
to the tar.el', the patlJ)S),ohist int erpretatlon readily follows.
Two :m&~o,r OOllSEH1UenOOG of this position are the affeotive oontin-

uum and

OJ.;

sanie sym};8 t~.

Come.tn1:ug the f1rst oousequenae, Re..rtshorne not en 'tbo:t

:pat1 ....

oepts in their fUll range. They 'betray themselYes by their rei terated charge that to psyohologize everything is to. humanize eve1'1thing ••
It ieeesy to show that we must generalise beyond pe7oh010g7 ..... it an ubi t.rarl1y l'eet.rioted l'lSyoholo81 is in question.
But the onl;,- sonu~ appron.ch is fir at to gene.rallze 0lU' psyohology_ If

tI.

3'1Ib3;d,., p. 121.

ZSCt. :tbii!.
,

,870111_ i. 411'801;17 Oppose4 to _te.rla.1.1.llI, whlch ·poalts the

.s-

leteJlG8 of rdo_, 41eoontinuoue, 41aore'8, 1D4epen4ent btta of
_tte.r. aenta of feeliDS and life, laolate4 exoept for aoo14ental
exte.rml .relatiollS. Umeles8 an4 lUlohansiDB w1 th .re.ptot to lnt8.... -

nal oonstitutlO1l .,ut bence 1d. thont ,1'owth and eyolution."St But U
1t le tne tltat all .slateata,

lns~fa.r

po ••es8 p.,.ollio t.N1ta in

VI&7 • •.r 111 aome aesr.e, nothlD1 Gall

'be 4eT014 of 11fe.

80tr8

The afteott.... eont1nu. 18 an 1l'lav......nt fo.r

.....~ taUlt, paloholosloal
_te.rl83.1..

as the,. are 11141Y14u.ala.

oo~."lons

wbloh t8D4 t. foste.r

llWthu. 'h0118h tMe acoviDe ls, in om wa7, a aon-

eeq••••e of p&l1pa7oJd.S1l'l. 1n ucthe.r it 1a part of the phenOll811010810&1 lntU.r7 .... lnaotar. ,hat ls, ... 1" ae.b to 8q11oat. expe.r-

m1sht oall 1" :pe.rt of .. "panpa101d.at pheDomenal..,._"
IS:,.. pobt. ua t. be n.ea in th1. oomeptloll. ., PSJ'Ohio
Ya.rlable. 1M be ...1,...4 mathe_tloal17. but the,. QuSh' not to be,
t . in .real1',. tlte,. &Noontlnuoua. 40 'b) Aesthetl0 qualltles are
lenoe.

\7.

not .,e17 associated wi. til seneo.r7 q_ll tles. thGJ are. in part at
leaat, 14entltle4 wi th senstJ.rl qaal1 tlea.

"!Phua. the 'plet,' of

,ellow 18 the ,.e11owness of tbe ,.e11ow... 41 ,.••lW oau be 8.l'.M\l;vaed

tnto 41ft.rent qual1 t16., bu.t we

tlltllit

.re. .be.r tJat these 41ffel'ent

39aeok, !I- 01',. t p. 92.
4Oo~le. Ba~t8harDe. fk. Ph&~OB~ aDd PBfOh010~of SensatloB (Oh1ca so. Ul1S.Y.,sitl ol'"1niloaao
pp.
~ ..

r'a;-nlr.

411,,4.,

p. '.
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qulitles are the .resUlts of analysls and do not exlet as suoh in
rea11t7.

0)

"Expe.t"lenoe is 8001a1 th.roughout, to lts uttermost

f1"agments or 'elements'." 42 Expe.rienoe DUst be oemelved as a
8001a1 oontinuum.

il) "The int.rlnsl0 mtures of sensory quali tles

tena to ln01 te modes of behav1ol'," and are not met-ely assooiated
w1 tll them. 43

e) SensO.r7 quall tles have a common o.rlgin.

nOn thls

po1:nt ... na_ly. the evolution of sensol'Y qualltles f.rom a oommon
01'1s1n. lB.rtahome's indebtedness to Petree's oste801"7 of fl.rstness

is pronounoed.

~U8

a oontinuum of sheer. undifferentiated, in-

ttete.rmtnate, 'VaBUG feel1ng beoomes speoifled and deie.rm1ne.te,
through a process of objeotifioatlon, lnto partioular sensOZ7
quali tles. '1144 Thus "fee11ng" ls p.r1mo.rdlall;v undifferentiated,

but made dete.rminate b7 lts objeotifloations at vulons levels and
1n T&rlous ways; fu.rthe.r, "feellng*' forms a continuum .rather than
a se.ries of dlso.rete values.

Thls leads to the seoond consequenoe, orBanio sJlllP&th1, fo.r
U

j.

L

r

1

I

•

421bid. f P. 8.

43r;b3t d•

0'

4"aeok,.u. oi t. p. 95. See The Fbl10S0:2h~ and P~Oh010fl
of Sensation, p. lJT""'"fhe f1rst appea.ranoe
a g~Ten· qU1t7 s.~a
ii.r'ialn .Iapln e'falutlon i8 not a p1U'e 'eme.rgenoe t (though it
has. an e:U1argen t, aspeot) of the quali t7. lll'l.related to the p.revious
state of atwe, but 1s 1l'1telllg1ble 1n muoh the same fashion as
the appearanoe of a new organ. A primitive quali t7 of aenaation
ma" be ooncel ved. suoh tlm t the development of mo.re speoifio qual1tles aay be made intelltglble as a true development. or dlfferent1at1ont .rathe.r than as a shee.r dlspl&.cement of the old and 1.r.ruptlon or the new." Also p, 208: "Aooording to this 'View.. the emEu.·.ent 1s not uttel'ly lneompuable to the pze-e:rist1118 qual1 ties,
but 1s .related to 1t as the mo.re to the less detel'.tnate."

14
all the PSlOhic variables can thtts be reduced to feell!!S, it this

tem 1s taken to include sensory and aesthet10 quali tles.

DOW,

aco01"dlng to panpayoh1sm, all 1n41viiiuala have the power of feeling t or of

8l1!1!: thz- 45

To

81JDp8 thl ze

w1 th ano the.r 1 e to share in

the feelings of another, or to inttli t his feellngs, a

feelings."

W

feeling of

But thls tntui tlon, while being the basis fG%' all know-

le4se, 1s not the cm.l1 kind of knowledge.

!that "human minds com-

m1Ul1oate 01117 1n41raotl:r. tlu-ouSh -.te.ri&l means,"'" and not b7 a
d1.reot :1nmltlon, is quite oby10us.
this 1ll41.reet

twe

without intuition, howeve.r,

of knowledge woulil be impossible.

An ind lyl dual lntl11ts the DBmbe!'s of his ovm bodr.

Buma.n be-

ings lntuit the feelings of the pa.rts of thei.r bodtes, or ahara in
thel.r 18el1.s. 4 '1

These parts nre

()1.1.r

cells, .hleh tntu t the

feellllg8 of their pal'ts, moleoules and atoms, as well as the feelings of the whole of whioh the,.

t:LN

a pa.rt, the human peu."son.

In

a somewhe. t similar way.. men and til e rest of the unlve.rse conatl tute the body of tbe world mind, or Godls mlnd, and In some degree
direetly know his 1.811n88.48 In the Ga.se of an eleGtrol'l, which
sq • •

r

II

•

450f. !glond, H11lI¥U,lan. pp_ 195-196.
~b.1.d... p. 19Eh
470f. l ..bl4,._ I p. 19'1.

<tSOf. ibid. t "We can now explain why men do not oOmnl1nicnte
wi th one aui'ftiG.... prlm.rl17 by 41 ..... ot a,mpath7. Oomplex minils like
01.ll". s

derlye their. complex oon.tent trom lnfel'lo.r minds through a

.....1& it on of pa.!"tlal dependenoe upon them, 1. e.. upon the lUll ts

composins thel .... bodies. If we hUll'Bl'l beings .reuh.a one anothe.r dl.rect17, weahOUld be dependent upon one anoth.!' 1n the Bame d.raatlc

15
has no bOd11y parts subject to it, its fellows or neighbozlng alect~ons

take the plaoe of a b04y.49 A hle~rchy is thus establlshed

in whioh we and OU bodl1y puts are lnte~dependent. and then
indeed would human personalities lose thel~ freedQm and dlstlnctn$SS with ~espect to one 8l'lothe~. But all thls is tho~oughly oonslstent with the ldea that hume.n minds do aot direotly upon thel~
!bodily ee.l.'Yaltts, .thC. oel1S1 eft vlce versa (the advantage on 0'I1.r
slde being that no one ind vidual in the body has marly as muoh
influenoe as otJ.r'"'OwirPersonality upon the whole slstem). It 1s also
oonsistent with the idea that low ....grade mindS, 'disembodied spir~ ts.' aot upon their equals directly and wi th the idea tbat men are
oells in the bOdy of Gotf yet are partlally free with ~espeot to
~im. It is only the oombinatlon of equality with oomplexity that
lmakes indi~eotness :neoessary in the relations among man. n
See also Pp. 284-285: nIt is necessary to this view that CJ.oo
should also be a datum for us, that we should d1..rectly pa~ticlJ.l8te
in him. And if positivists do not know it, 1t might pe~haps interest them to be told that the great theolpgla.ns have asserted dIre6t
thoughf'alnt intUition of God not onli tor ~tlos but for all men.
Augustine's doctrine Is noto~ious: but AqU1:ras ca.n be shawn to
quality .rather than negate it. All talk of l.ttmamnce is a quibble
indeed. It it be denied. Peiroea.sserted 1t. \~ltehe8d's theory of
dtrect :prehensions of one' lndi Vidual by another .reoognises no exoeption With .regard to Godi, whose oontrol of the world is through
the direot thoush mo.re or less 1"&8ue a.wueneas whioh each oooasion
has of his enTiaagement of the future.
1t 1'he notion of the direot awareneSs of God Is the only e:rplan• tlon of the seuerlo 1ntni tiona whioh metaphysios olaims for man.
~n ex1stential scope these Int111 tions Ue equivalent to omniscienoe,
thoush in qualit7 of aleamess they are anything but eqUivalent to
It. They tell us nothing whatever about details as suoh, and eTen
~s gene.rali tiea thel are at best obsc1U'e. But the .range of obJects
to whioh the7 are .relevant is identical wi th the .$llg8 known by
W87

God. "

490f. Ra..rtshome, The fOBiC of Perfection, p_ 195: "fo rendar
an eleotron or oth8~ par""Tro e an O1giii!sm ti ts only neoessary that
nelghbortng eleot~ons O~ othe!' pa.rtiolea shOllld contribute di.reotly t.· 0 eaeh other's Talues, that ls, sbonld dlrec. tll" feel each other. • •• But pe!'baps a pa~tlcle, like a disembodied spirt t ~ has no
bodily part.s. I.ts intimates, 11' any, will be its equals.'
See also p. 196: "Renoe 1 t 1s ~he particle, the lowest. not
the hisheet, org&:rl1sm .. in spite of what has often been sa.id about
God - that best fits the idea of an unembodled spirit. The pa~ti
ole. one might say, is embodied only 1n its enVironment, not in
itself."
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of particles, at0JD8. molecules, oells. animals, men. mel God, all
of wh10h (exoept the lBl'tlcles) dl.rectll teel the teellq8 of the
puts of their boA1es.
D. ARGtnmITS FOR PABPSYOBISJI

lJarlsho1'D8 oflus the. six ruther &rp.mer1ts to.r panpeloblam:
1) Call_11t,. oan be expla1:aed oDl7 b7 the persistenoe of the
past into the present b7 aane of I'tfnllo.ry.50

So Ie' 1.1.8 81I.p:poee that the 1%1t1.11 tlve relation, whioh
we have held to be SJ1llP&th8tio 1n ee_noe. is p.r1ma.rlly a
.81atlon of .,..,.thr wlth the oausatlve pZOoesses 1D the
bod,. It follows that the oelle of the b04; 01' 1. te molecules, or both. maet be pSJehle 1n thelr maDDe1' and degree.
Indeed 1f oau8al1t7 in the mind-bod;, instanoe 1s 87mpathetic, ". sllOU14 at once lnqUlre it all 08118&11t1 ~
not be so e%plalned and it the .,e.r7 ldea of t1me doe s not

luvolve the notion of a
enta of time •

•

s~thetle

bond between the

~.

•

• • • • 1s•e%plained
• • • • •by• calling
• • • • the
• • .relat10n
• • • • •oausal,
• • • •
But• nothlng
slnoe as "e saw above t modern philosoph»' has total17
tallel to tind 8.117 lntell1g1b Ie account ot causall t7 except the aplaDatlon of It in tess of the Qmpathetl0
rappo.rt [ot Panpl 70hl_]. 51
Ba.rtaho.n&e oppose. tlae poelt1Y1stl0 l11te.rpl'etatlon of 08.u8&11 t1 to

h18 GOlDe_ion of Ol'pnlo Qmp.\th7.

Elths.r hie posltlon JDWJt be

a4o:pted. he sal'S, or oauealltl' must be altoge'\he.r

ab&n401'184. 52

n.

6Oof. leok,
01t ... pp. 9'.98; Charles lfa.rtsbome Realltz
!AI Soo&.91 Prooese----moitOD, Beaoon P.ress: Glenooe. 111" ;.ree :Press,
D!)!). PP. "U.'\7.
51l:Ial'tshOl'J18. Bel~nil Bn1rp!pl~8m. pp. 19' f 198-199.

52Hartshor.De, Re~llty ~ ~oo~al P.roc~se, p. '9.
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2) Apart t.rom panpsychlsm, the.re is no answeJ." to the questlon

ot unlty-and-mllltiplicity.

0.1"

unity wlth111 divo1'slty: foJ." only unto.

'Versal subjeotivlt)' provides the .requisite Ulllty.53
3) Likewise, the 00nt1'8st of p8.1'tioula.r and tUliTe.rsal, aotual

and potential, is furnisbed wi th a pl1.nolple only by universal subjectivlty.54
4) SUbjects

can ohoose between alte.rnatlve poss1bll1ties. But

there 1s so_th111g correspondlng to oholoe in (supposed) non-sub380",S,

"811'1oe tbe con01"ete 1s always 10gical1; arbit.rarJ'; tl 55 this

choioe in a non-sub3eot seems total17 lUlintel1igible.

5) Qualities belons onl; to subjeots; if all indivlduls s1'e
not subjects. how are non-subjeots qual.lfied,56
6) A sub3eot has lnt1'ln810 values.

TO be interested in a sub-

jeOt ls to partioipate in lts values, and henoe to enrloh oneselt.
t

53aeclt.

•

0EJ.

olt •• 1" 98.

See also gealMl as Social .F.rooess.

p. "9 t. and. Ohi.r e81rartsh.ome, "1'. he PhilosopQ orOzes'!ve ~ynt1ie8"

ls," Joumal of Philosol\ll. 55 (1958). pp. 944-945:

It

'8111the8is'

means 'putitni tOletS1", a oombining of faotors lntoa whole. The
obvious example of a s.rnthesis 1s a single moment8.l'Y h't.1.man expel'lenoe in whioh the.re is a d.ive.rel ty of data,. things expe.rlenced.

t
Experenoe
puts tosethe1' ita data; theee remain several, but the
experlenoe in and by whioh they are put togethe1' is one. Synthesis
is thus the solutloD of the problem of 'the ono and the meny. ,n
Maeok,.2I._ oit.! P. 98: see a.leo Hartshorne, Roalltl.!!

~o.qlal ~l'OCeBs. pp;-l7-S0.

55xbia •• p. 82.
56IJ>id., pp. 80-82: see also Reck.• E..,E. ~1 t., p. 98.
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Know1118 the enJoJment whioh another feels over some Talue-ob3eot is

to possess Talue oneself. A non-subjeot has no values and is not
able to give a subjeot-enriohlng knowledge.

It has nothing to

reward a subject's interest. 57
Both Hartshorne's systematic formulation of panpsycblsm and
his

arguments for it are based on his first-mentioned oon-

furthe~

eept ion of' philosoph;v. But philosophy as the study of "oompletely
non-restrio1d.TG existential statements" gives .rise to oe.rtsin oonclusions whioh differ in their expliolt formulation.
Besides "Somthing exists," we find that "Expe.d.enoe ooours"

1s also neoessarily true.

The statement oan easily be verified,

fo.r it is obvious that experienoes oocur; but "is the statement

oonoelvably falsifiable? Would any e:Jpe.rlenoe e:xhlbi t the total
nonooourrenoe of experienoe? Olearly not."5B Using the same oriteria, we find that neoessarily, a) creative syntheSis occurs;
the~e

are oonozete aotualities whioh are all both

exte~ally

b)

and

internally related; c) infallible, or divine, experienoe ooours,
and it has falli'ble experienoes among 1. ts obje ots. 59

These oon-

elusions are moze or less summaries of Hartshorne's basic positions
in neat 10gioal for.m and do not differ essentially from his earlier
h

t

•

5'Baztshorne. Realltz!! ~ocial Proces~, pp. 82.83; Reck, ~.
clt., PP. 98.99.
58ual"tshornol. "Ue'taphysioal. statements ae Non-Restrictive sal
Existential," p. 38.
59:tpi,d •• p. 47.
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pOsitions, exoept in the G%plio1t ..nner he 8J."J!'lves at them: we do
not ask, "Is experienoe possible if they are fa.lser but, "Al:'e the1
veriflable 'but nonfals1flablef'
~his

rough sketoh of HartShorne's panpcyoh1em neods to be

oo~

plated b1 a dlsousalon of his oonoeption of God, who forms an Integl"a.l

ps,l"t

of his philosoph3'.

Ol:tA.PTER II
IA.TURE AND

EXIS~NOE

OF GOD

God is not something 1noidental to Hartshorne's metaphysics;
.rath~u't

"God as supreme psyohe completes the panpsyohic system."l

But as this is a oonolusion .rather than a begilU11l'lg, we must firet
explain the t1P8S of possible oonoeptions ot God, B'a.rtsho.rne's oonceptton. and his pJ:'oofs fo.r God'a existenoe.
A. TYPES OJ' OOlfOEPTIONS OF GOD

:Il&rtsho.rne begins his philosophioal theology with an explanation of God's mture • .rathe.r than with p.roots to.r Hls enstenoe.
Re offe.rs these reasons tor his prooedure:t.radit1onal proofs fo.r

God I s ex1etenoe lead to the t.radi tlonal conceptlon of God, or a.re
based on s110h a conception.

!hey have, turthe.rmo.re. been proved

unsat1staot01')'t
We might not un.reasonably begin with an examination
of 'the t.rad1t10nal p.roots fo.r God. These proofs of course
lead, if aD.1Whare, to [t.raditlonal theism]. They have
been a_mined IBl1Y times by leading philosophers and,
wi th ino.reasing frequency and emphas1 B, Judged tulsa t1sloha.rles Ba.rtshorne, "llan 1n Nature," Ex~.rienoe, Enstence.
Good; EssNs 1n Honor of Faul W'8iss, IV; tHin l'J. tie'S
~oon4a1e, Southern~!!nols-'nlve.rsltl Press, 1961), p. 462.

and

_t~
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tacto~y. Ought I to add my mite to this 3udgment o~
attempt to co~rect modern philosophy on a matte~ whioh
1 t has so oarefully oonside~ed' It may be sald, however.
that the proofs have not been really met on their own
g~cun4. The~e is acme justlce in this claim. .edem
thought has otten d~lfted so fa~ trom medieval meta....
phJsloa as s08.l."ee17to see w.hat that me_physics was
about. But the force of this cons1ile~atlon is weakened,
fo.r me atlaast, by another. Modern thoqht has not been
oontent to pass Judgment on the t.raditlonal proofs; It
has alec proposed disproofa of God as conceiTed in t.raditional theology. These disproofa bave, if &Dithlng. been
eTen lees adeqn&ioly Det by traditionalists than traditional proofs b1 tteil" oritios.!

Proofs for his own oonoeption of God. might be
point, but without

ti~at

So

suitable sta..rtlng

making this Idea of God explioit, it would

be "impossible to look tOl" 8Tidanoe without knowing what idea ls to
be tested.,,3 BLrtshome's proof flows out of his oonoeption; the
meanIng of the
\nte~e

wo~d

"God- is of primal'1 1mpol"ianoG.

can we find out what God ls' Hen of all ages have had

some ldea of the divine mtue, and despite

thei~

ms.ny differenoes,

all seem to have this mueh in common: -To discusS God ls, by almost
un1Te~sal

usage, to dlaouss some marmet" of'supl'eme' or 'highest'

or 'beet' individual (or

supe~lndividual)

being_

As a minimal def-

initlon, God is an entity somehow superior to oth~ entities."4
Rartshorne then giTes this analysiso'! the Anselmtan notion of God
20he..rlea ]'ia..rtshome, lIan' sViston of God (Ohioago and New
York, Wlllett,Ola.rk, cd 0'0., IOU J. "PP; "!'r-58.
3zbid., p. 58.
".tbld.. p. 6.
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as "that than whloh none greater oan be oonoelved" I

11

-

'None' -.y

-

mean 'no entlty other than th&t (tho belng 8ald to be perfeot) as

!1 aO,tua1lZ J:.!.. t
elthe.r 1&

.......

01'

......

01"

else

2. t rtAy mean 'no entity othol" than

00111(1
III
• *_A

meaning. the perieot 1s
even ]!z
eXC8it

~tseH;

be or beoome.'

...... ____

r

uns}U'l?!ssabl~

Aooordlng to the tl.rst
in

o.<!:q,~eJlt1~~

.2.t posa1bili tz

according to the seoond mewns it 1s

l!l. i tseM_ " 5

!h!1 !.! 11

un8ur~ssable

The fi.rst mea!'l1l'lg 1e oalled "ab 801u te pe.rfec-

tlon," the seoond ".relative. "The wo.rd "g.reate,· oan mean "'in
some (but not all) .respects' (8&Y in sise o.r 1n ethical. goodness);
or we _y mean, 'in all .respeots whatever;' whl1e the 30int negative of these two. 'in no l"espeot.· 81ves the th1.rd posslbill ty."
l.rol1 the vulou8 oOlllblna.tlons of these posslble meamngs, .Ra.rtshorne works out these seven possible types of oonoeptlons of God:
1) Absolute pe.rteotlon in all .respeots;

fa) Absolute pe.rfectlon In some .respects, .relative pe.rfeotion

in aU others:

3) Absolute perfeotion, relat1ve pe.rfeotlon. and lmps.rteotlon,

eaoh in some respeots;

4) Absolu.te pe.rteotlon in some respeots» lmpe.rteotion in all

ethel'S:

5) Absolute perfeotion in no .respeots, relative in all;
6) Absolute perfection in no respeots, relative 1n some, im-

perfeotion in others;

V) Absolute perfeotion 1n
•

Ji

6]:b1d., pp. ' ...8.

6Ib,d •• p. 8.

no respeots, 1mpe.rteotion in all. 6

Th1s listiD8 is 10gloal11 oomplete, but does not mantio!! speolfio
attributes.

Hartshorne gives these flva attrlbutas
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the moat

important aDd most often mentioned:
1) Eter_l -

that 113, in some or all aspeotsof his reallt;v
devoid of ohtmge;

in some o.r all aspects ca16ble of eb.e.nee, at
least in the fo.l'1D of increase of some kind;

2) Tempo.r&l -

3) Oonsolous?, aelf-e.wue;

4) lCnow!l'l8 the "'01"14 OJ:' un1Terse, omn1s01ent;

6) Wo.rld-1nolusive, haYing all thinSs as oonstituents. 7
The aeleotl'9'8 oombination oftheae speoifio att.rlbutea e.ooor-

ding to the geneRl patte.rns given in the f1tst 11stlns glves .rlse
to nine 1118torlo&117 s1fP'11f1oant conoeptions of God s
1) !he SUpreM as E1;el'rJal-Temponl Consoiousness, la10Wlq and

inoln.d1ng 'the l'/o.rld. Attrlbuted to

~enthelsmt

51'1 31ft, Sohelling, Feolmel', WIll teliiid,

rlehmn.

Pla'to,

!qDa%, Ra4hak-

2) The Supreme a3 Eternal Ooneciousness, not knowing or Inolu41D8 the world. Ada,o.~1.e:.rJ ....."_he.i.am
.....· •

8) The Supreme as EteJ!"na1 OOl'lSolonaneae, Knowing but not inoltuU.ng the world •. 01&881081 theism: Philo, j ..U8ustine t
Anselm, a1.Ghaszall. rqninas. "'tA!\ln"'ls.
4) The Su:pftme as the Eter.l be70nd consoiousness and knowledge. Emna.tion1sm: Plotinus •
. . .- . II

{)

I

••

•

The SUpreme as Eternal Oonsciousness, Knowing and inoluding
the wo.rltl (ao far lIle '1'esl'). !2.l..!'!'~!31oa+. P!nt.he1s~: SanPl"a, Spinoza, R0)10fh

6 ):ttheSup.reme as Etemal-Tempo.ral OonsolouBneas, Xllowlng but
t

1

•
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not 1noludtng the world.
Lequ1e~.

Temio~a~lstlc

thelsm: Sooinus.

7} The Supreme as Eternal.Temporal Oonsoiousness, partly ex-

oltud:ve of the World. tillitrEtd, 2nentheism: James, Ehrenfels, Brightman.

8) The Supreme as wl10117 Temporal or emerglng Oonsciousness.
Alexander. Ames. Oattell.
,) The SUprell8 as Temporal and nonooDsoioua. Wie.n. 8
This

thl~d

llstins 1s not 108108lly or

hlsto~oal17

oomplete, but

oonta1ns the most important oonoeptions wMoh are histOJ:"lcal17 uempllfied.

Notloe that only the tust alte.rnatlTe, panenthelsm.

manages to oombine all five of the attributes ln the seoond list ..
ing. All other oonoeptions have failed to lnolude some attribute

or the other. and so have nade God less than the Perfeot :Being, 9
or that being than wbloh no other oould be oonoeived to be more
perfeot.
Olassloal thelsIn, for example, excludes relatlve perfections
from God and thus oonoei1'es of Him as less than Perfeot BelIl8.
B'artsho.rn&, on the other hand, dOGS not deny absolute :perfeotions
of GOdl • but does not see that the inolusion of the se in God neoessarily implies the exolusion of relative perfeotions.

The two are

oompatlble. 10 On the ground of the compatibility of absolute and

Saarts!l0me aJ1d Beese, Ppl1os9J2hers Speak

!.t!!.!!..

p. 17.

'.tbld.. pp_ 17..24. and also lIartshome' S o.rl t1018ms before and
after tlie seleotions throughout the book.
lOaf. Oharles B'a~t8ho.rne. "Tillloh and the Othel' Gnat Tnu.11tlon," Al'!!liolUl Theolo€Qoa1 Review. July, 1961, p. 4: "Tbel'e 18 the
long. power!urStridltlon f.6at ~o! is the infinite, unoonditioned,
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.relAtive perfeotions 1n God, olassical theism oan be rejected. be08.l1Se

it unneoessarily makes God lese than Perfeot Being, and has

been disproved and can be replaced with a more satiefaotO.r7 alternati.. :
Fo" nea.rly two thousand years European theology has
staked lts fortunes upon e. oerta1n oonoeption of div1nity.
In the last deoade or two a genuinely alte1"native tJ'P8 of
theol08Y has been proposed - so unobt.rusiTelY, however, that
nea.rly all opponents of theism a.re stl11 fighting the olde1"
conception, oon'finoed that if they oan eli.sposs of it the
theol0810e,1 question w111 be settled. And those who teel dlssatisfied with 8. Godless universe suppose that it is to 1s.rad1 tlonal thaolesy that they must turn. Both ]Briles are mistaken. 1'04&7 the theistl0 question, 111ts so ma.~ othel's, is
a def1n1tely new one i·. The old oontl'oversies ln thelr old
torm are antiquated. 1
Furthermore'. pa.nenthelsm, slnoe it makes God the truly Perfeot
Being. also makes 11m the tnly wo.rshipful belng. the possesso.r of
su:p.reme value not onlJ;' oon81d81'&d ln Himel!, but also ooneldel'ed

precisely unae.r the as:peot of His relations w1 th men.

B'al'tsnorne

asles, ·Can tbe idea of deity be so formulated as to preserve, per-

haps even

ino~easo,

lts

~ellg1ous

value' By religious value I

me~

the power to 8xp!"ese and enhance reverenoe o.r worship on a hi8h
ethloal and oUltural level.

The question 1s whether ana how God

oan be oonoeivea. w1 thout 10g1oal absurd! ty, and as havl:r.l.,g suoh a

and the crrel'simple assumption that the dls3unotlone infinite-tint te. absolute-reJa ttve, unoonditloned-condi tloned are simply exclusive. I haTe often shown.t. and haTe not yet been .refuted, that
thel' are not so." See also l:'hl1oso;ehe,x:s S2!ak; ..!! God" pp. 50'1-508.
lloha.rlee Hartshorne, "Red. e.f1nittg God," Bew IlUmnist (Ohioago), 'I (1934), p. 51 see also len's Tls10n..2! ~oa:. "W'. r=::2.

2&
charaoter that an enlightened person m!!\:,v wOl"shlp and earve him w1 tll
whole hea.rt and mind."12

The e:recut1on of this .. o~.ct, to b.r1ng

God to the enlightened person, quite definitely does not belong to

the above-mentloned tradition that would make 11m absolute

-

(~e-

late4), 1}pUtable, eternal (non-temporal), and w_14 predioate any

positive att..rlbute of Him onlY in a slmbolic mannu.
tion tells
~;

tta

This tradi-

(or tMnkB it does), B'a.rtsllo.rne .,s. what God 1s

no partloula.rll great lntelllg1bl1it7 resides 1n a series of

nep.t1ollS, n04" oan an abstzaotlon readi11 be wo.rahipped:

concede:, do these thiI)gs I s7ftlbolioal11 t •
what..,.el' tlla'l . , mean, but we tell him 1n no unoertain
terms that he wet not 11 t8.r&.11.1 do th.' Is this modest,.
Ol* is 1 t monstrons presmption' Have we tbis veto
power upon dlvlnli,? Not to sustain relationships, not to
respond sensitivel,. to the enstenoe of others, i8 to be
. wooden, stupid. or an utterl;y empt1 a'bst.rao'U.on. It 1s the
a\)8t1'&.01; whleh bas these nesative charaoteristios, not the
('H)l1Crete.... 18 Goa to be four:ul me.relJr in this d1.reot10n.
looking toward the less and less oonoret.,15
Be (GOd) J$\1' t we

!he

~t'!.1l1~oloQ

will .rather 'be in positive terms; m.ore spec-

If_ioal17. 1t will be stated qUs,ll'U.tatlvelY.

This app.roaoh Will al-

low people to acttl8.111 unde.rstand what is being said .. rather than
being lett lJ:? the throes of "D'G'ste.rY':

The differentia at the new definition ~e that it is positive rather than negative, and that it is qQantltative
r8the1' tban merely qualitative. It 11mits oOlDpa.rison between
the create.r and the oreatures to d1ffe.renoes of degree. It
•

I

..

unlve;!~i~i;:s~ri=T~ep*~ ~!.l!tts~e~:la;i,!lf-

Raven, Yale

13xaztshorne, "T11110h a.ud the other Great !f.radlt1on. n pp. 6'1; see also The R~~.~ ReJ.~tlvi t,l, pp. 10-19.

2'
wl11 be admitted that relative or quantitative distinotlons
are characteristio of sclentifio thought wherever it has
been euocess1ul. But it is a OUl"ious :paJ."atlo% that in theol081 it is precisely the popular rather than the teohnioal
oonceptiona whioh are the most ~iguouBll quantitative in
meaning. Oontrast these (teohnical oonceptions), with their
relative11 qualitative or negative oonnotations, - With suoh
popular notions as almighty. all-knowing maker of all things.
fbe OQmmGn basis of these latter descriptions is the quite
positive and ~antltatlve idea of all-ness or total1tl. l4
Hartshorne's oontentlon then is twofold: the tradltion whioh makes
God in all .respeots absolute or unrelated aotually makes 1I1m less

than perfect; this same tradition falls to make God eufflcientl7
intelligible to the educated person and so does not suppl1 h1m with

a proper objeot of worship.

In

~e,

Dirt..,

a~lati11.tz.

Hartshorne diStinguishes the mean-

ing of "perfect" and "absolute."

Aocordi:ns to the prelimil:l.t.l.r1 def-

inition given aboTe" God is the Perfeot BalDS; but this is not the
same as 881tns that God ls the AbsolRte

Bel~.

that ls. the being

who ls entlre17 nonrelative. 15 !~aditional 'tbeol081 has mlstaken17
used "pert'eot" ln this double sense (w1thout .realising it)

ana 80

fallen into a dl1emna: 1f the Pel'fect Being sustains no .real. nonessential .relations With 1mpel.'feot beings, lIe is less than the Pe.rfeot-and-the-l:mpe.rfeot (that Is, the Pe.rfeot Beins as sustalning
l4a'a.rtehorDe'. " Redefuing God'," Pp. e.9.
15ua.rtshorne:,

l2!! ~ivine Re;L!tlvltl.

pp. 18-19.
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such l'ela tlonsh1ps) J ihus God is actually le ss ihan Pe.r:tect Belng.

an

i:b8 othel' bal'Jd', lf the nonrelative Pel'teot Being lssaill to In-

olude aU the !!lues ot the imperfect (and so has no need at rel....
tlons With the

lmpel'feot~,

• God dld no good th1ng. when he created

the wo.rld t and our huma.n exlstenoe 1s Jl'ltrtaphysloally tweless and

mea:n.t n gle8s. ft16 If God actually includes all posslb1e Taltles, o1'e-

m.. ana

atures oan o01'1Ulbute noth1ng to

so are useless.

Detm1l'l8 the Pel'tect Being as that 1.n4ivldual 'than which B!.
othe.r11'1411'14_1 oould be peatel' avoids this d11Eumna.
Inoue].atl" In

so~

Be oan inolude 1t.

.respeots, ,but

.rela~ive

It GOd 18

to the wo.r1d in othe.rs,

fte \'101'14, howGvel', ls tempo.ral and thus God

must be tempo.ral also.

!bu God at one time ls more pe.rfeot than

Be ls at Goihel', beoause He inoludes e. g.reaie1' .reallty on some

0008.8101'18 than on othel's, and so surpasses B1mself in p8l'fectio1'1
fl'om one t1rna to anothel'.1'
Row oan God inolude tbe world' lJl.l'tahorm agrees wlth tl'ad1tlonal thought when it says the. t

God

knows eve1',Ji;hiD8,

Ol'

1s omnl..

801ent, this mans llte.rally that GOd knows eve.rJ1;hing that then
is to be known; eve.r7thlng. that ie, wh10h nght
821stlns and so
1. t. 18

.e be

known.

110\'1

is aotuall1'

But to know eometh1ng 18 to inolude

Henoe GoA 1no1uaes evv7thlns He knows - the whole wo.rld.

16Ilri~ •• p- 19.
17tb'4.~ p- 20.

18J.bld., p.

'6.
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One might ask B!.rtsho.rll8 to explain \Vh; God met Bustain .real,
nonessentlal .relations to the wo.rld in orda.r to know 1t.
\Ve.r, quite DIttntl..,. ls that "a.ctnal knowll'18 1s

.relg.tl~

B1s anato what 1n

pt..rt1oula.r _wens to ex1st and the.refore as enstent oan be known.
But what in pt..rt1oula.r 1s known in a given krJ.l)wledg8 ls not in lie
existenoe .relative to 'th1.e knowledge.
~eot,

tOl'i,

It, theni. the known, o.r 01>-

1s the non.relatift. &:nil knoWing or subJeot the .relatlve, fao&8

we haft Jut seen, must not GoI,

88

all-knowing', be np.reme

17 .relatt verr 19 T:batis, unless we 1I18h to tall back into the unlntelllgibll1t, of' analogical predloation, God' e mowlng muet be
t.rea ted as o.f the same type as the knOWing we e:.rpe.rienoe. in whloh
the one knowing is J:'ela tl va to what he mows.
Anothe.r seem1l2s1;v .reasonable obJeotion is that if le88. 'falue
1s belllS aold.eTed in the

WOl'ld

at one time than another, that ls,

1t there 18 lese of ftlll8 to be Jmown in the .o.r1d .. will not God' s

,e.r2eot10n dec.rease In comparison to its former state,
This ob Jeotlon lpoJ:'ee tbe diTS.ne memOl'", whioh i8 of suoh a
natu.rethat 1t .retains pe.rmanently whatever Goa at &n7 time knowe.
The valuee known b7 God on one oooaslon beoome 1*.rt ot tis very
being. 3ust as we J:'eoelve .real thol2.8h ac014enta1 boremenia to our
being when we know obJeots.

Thevaluea we aohieve pass away and

a.re lost 1 God permanel'J:tly .retalns them in !Ii8 memo!"" howeyer. and
tho# thus add to the perfeotion

ne

has alread7 ooma to possess in

30
mowing prertous values. Assuming that there is always more value
in the world at ansr given time than disvalue (rather than that
there is more disvalue. for tbe forme.r seems to be the aotual. Gase)
God's perfection is an always inoreasing one.

It

The fiNt horn of

the dilemma," lIartshorne remrks, "need not C01'lOe.Yn us, 1U1less it
can be proved thla. t the.Y. 1s ever more sorrow the.n 307 in the wOl"14.
Fol" if thel"s Is &11'1&78 mol'e satisfaction than dissatisfaction, then
God should always haTe mol'e l"eason to l'e301ce than to grieve ovel'
the world:, and since he can retain the oOllBclollSDeSS of past 307S,
thel'e 1'1111 a1wa,8 be a .Bert
increment
of Talu aco.ru1l'lg to God at
.....
to
I

eaoh moment.

Ifow if llfe wel'e not more satlsf71D8 than othel'W1se,

oould It go onY"!O God is the Pel"fect ,:Beins beoause Be poseesses
mo.re values than a.n,y othel' indlvidua.l; fOlt B'e possesees the
tota.l of all values of all beings at

aQ'

one tlme.

SWD

lIe l'etalns the

values lie aoquu.-ee b; knowledse and so oontiXl'll&l17 stU'passes lH.mself 1n pel'tection.
This tntel'preta.tlon of "pel'feot" makes God both intelligibltt

and worshipful.

RelfU:diDg the fizst pOint, B'a.Ytshorne acknowl.

edges, wlth traditional theoloS;, that God 1s omniscient, for example; but th1s omnisoience takes on a new neanlng.

"Omnieoienoe

is knowledge that is in some sense equal to lts ob3eots, 1t21 or capable of knOWing them pel'fectl1', while nonamnisclenoe 1s not thus
2O:sa.rtahomel ,

1!h,e Riv1S! R.elati-v:~tl, p_ 46.

211b14 •• p. 120.
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equal. Omniso1ence is an abstract perfectlon. or the generallsation
from a set of conaret. instances of perfeot knowing of lndividual
0'b.1ects. 22 Fwthe,r, Godts knowledge of the wo.rl~ oannot be constl ..

tu.ted by a. "s1ngle Inclusive and unique JlelatlOl1,lt eyen though "lts
tem 1s the one totality of belng," beoause
poienUal! tles 11'1 the world.

w. flnd aotuallties

Eaoh _at have a corresp0n41ng

and

tn-

of adeqa.a.te mowl.edge, the aotual known as actual and the potential
known as potenUaJ.. 23

But what is at one 'time potential becomes

actual, hence a new knowledge of the actual as

8110h

lished if oognltive adequaoy 1s to be maintained.
to the potential as suoh.

To define

11

must be estab-

The same applies

omrdsQienoe l1 as adeq1.'lAte

knowledge of what aotually exists as aotual, and of what potentla.llJr exists as potential'. necessitates posltll'lg the temporaU.ty of

God.

Jo.r omnisoienoe ls then reoo8ll1sed as an

It

W1n1te class of

!.relationships," 1n that an omnlsoient being knows adequatel3' eaoh
totallty sepa.rately as lt pleaents itself to be known.

This in:tln-

1 te class has the oommon ohazaoteristlc of "adequacy, n whlch prop.

en), 1s not!, hOl'leTer, .relatlve to the objects mown, as are the
conca'e exemplifications of "oosn1 t1ve adequBC7. ,,24
God's perfeot1ons, in the liSht of this analysis. take on a
d.Dl oha.racte.t'.

In Bls abstmot natve God is absolute (or 'tIll.rela-

22;}J&d.', p. 121.
23xbld.
r
t

A

2~,b&d.
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ted to' the world) in Ble p9l"teotions; Ii1s caplolt7 to'· &iiequatell'
know eve.rl'thil18 ls entuely nna1'feoted by other th1118s.

In as

concrete mtue Be 1s not only relative. but the JnC)st .relative of

being s, Since lalQ'lls dge ef all things deJlll9.llas dependence on all

things.

Ged cannot know a value whlch someone creates

person actueJ.ly Cl"sates 1t.

Ins

and possesa!.ng value

~ss

that

God's e:nrlohment of His being by kn(M' ..

em.s

.relatiVity) thus dependa entl,rel.v en

Bls ol'eatv•• ' acttTltiea and lI1sown conorete aot1v1t1es in asetst~ ~mtocna._lue.

Acool'tU.ng to B'a.rtshe.me's conception, then, God has all the

pel'feotlol'ls asoribed to' Blm b7

t~adltlO'nal

pel'fectlens

OJ.' :e<tt,e~l:al.l.tles

.realO8.l!:cl t14U,

0'1'

thought. as abat1'8ct

which cannot be

affectea. by ethel' beings; at the same time He possesses mOl'e value
1n m.e oono.retG natu6 than any ethel' indiv1dual (even 11 the world
is taken as an lniU,vldu.al', for Be posaessea all the values o.reated
in the world) ad so is the tl'Ul1 Pel'feot BelJl8.
The .religious TaluS at God, on theothe.r hand, 1s not 4eat.royed b1 B1s .relatlT1t7 aDd H1.s dependenoe

011

lIis o.rsatlU'es.

lil.l"tshOl"DfJ oom;onds tblt "for the present, 1 suggest that all we

oan assert to

."v.

obvious .relig10us value is the fal th that Goi 1s

to be r911e4 upon to do for the wOl'ld all that ought to be done tnt'
1t, and w1 th as much su.rvel' of the future as ths.re ought to be o.r

as 1S 148al17 des1l"able."25 Omnisoience in the sense of a totum
•
t.

•

I

,.1'

1/1'
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s~

knowledge or

nontea;o~al knowing (ana

consequent

o~dezing)

of the 1'101"14 1s not requ1..red for e. wozsh1pable God; lnaeed, thls
oonoeptlon has caused oonslderable ..religious diffioultles. 26 For
1t, for example, God mows ever.Yf;h1118 that 1'1111 happen, how oan Be

allow evil to ooou.r and stl11 be called 800d? This single d1ffloult7 1s enoqh to show us that all that relig10n needs 1s a God
who knows wbat th8n 1s to be
1 ty !!.

o..rwl~.q

mown

(all aotual and possible ..real-

1 t is aotual o..r possible) and a 10Ying o.rdezins of

the wo.rld in aooordanoe with that lalowledp.
God

Of oourse, because

does not know pe.rfeotly what will happen, evils do oootu'; but

e shoUld not expeot the imposs1ble.
God fa

t..radl tlonal re11810u8 perfeotlon 1£1 not only maintained,

ut even mueased, by panenthelsm.
tion.

Oeneid • .r the follow1ng situa-

God t S 00l10..rete P8.rt801;10n aepends on the values He knows

adequate17 (and thus possesses h but these ftlues are orea:ted by
B1s ozeatu.res 1n the wozld.
bute to lt1s pezteotlon.
fo.r

God

1'he....efo.r. God's CHain.r.s oan oontrl-

ney can ohoose

01' ~etuse

to ozeat. val:l1e

to know and pOSHsst

What 1s the inoluslve value of human life? Is lt human weltue onl7' Is 1t the "glozit1oatlon" ot God defined as so
oomplete17 absolute that 1 t must be beyond OU pOWe1' ",0 Contzlbute to his s.rea.tnees? A new eft in .re11810n _,. 'be p.redieted as soon Be men grasp the ldea that 1t 18 3uet as true
that God ie the supreme beneflc1a.ry OJ.' .r8011191'1t ot aohievement, henoe supremely .relative to all aclaev.« aotualities.
as that he 1s the supreme benetaoto.r or source ot achievement. and in eo tar nonrelatlve to its ze8U!Mtu~ has
;. ..1\ S
0 \"1 £'~''''
~~
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bee. a !leo.ret polson 10»8 wo.rld.nS in .rellsloue thou;ht ana
teellD8. the polaon of man'. wantins to be an ultimate .reolltent ot Talue. Reli8ion then beoomee mab's eelt-ee~1oe.
not sen1'l1lle17 hi8 .enloe of God. :ro.r it Goc1 orm 'be indebt.'
to 110 0Jl!', 0aJl noel...e ...alue t.rom no one. then to spealt of
.e.n1.ng um 18 to b14\1lge in equ.1vooatlon. l ,
Bariahor:ne' a basto oOMep'llon of God 18 aependent in 1.'8 o.rlsin on
tile Mstonoal meard.q of "God"

all.,......ful. all-10Ylns.

&8

the Pel'teot Debg. OJIDlaos.ent,

1*l'e.41 ttonal tho118h:t ha4 _de the.e ab-

.'bact ,.....1801;lona into oono.ret. pe.rfeotloae and thus had
the al,..olate.a.

&888....te4

o.r no.e1&t1'9'tt7 of G04. But the t.radltltmal Joe-

ltion e.I'e4 in tMa .re,a.rd.

God'. abe",",ot ,..tfeotlona &1'e

»11ftea in o01lUe1;. "lations of taowlugf 10Ylns. w1l11l1s;
abet.raotlJ'a'baolu"e but oOl1o....et.17 ..latl,.e.

8X• •-

Be

1.

Beoopta1Jl8 tMs p......

e..,fte BI t.ra4t tlemal _anlnB as Pe.... feot Bel. (thoup tn a new
. ea•• )

a8 ...11 a8

enhanolns Be .r811,101.1s Tal_.

Bartahol'D8 has 81Y8a ..hat he cODalae!'e a oohe....en'l. poaltt...e17
.....lIlSf'&ll 4e:t1nt'lon of Qoa~, be81mlq w1't;h what men have said

about Blm. olaaaltnns tk1a, abstl'aotl.DB the 8sBent;lal feature.,
ead wo.rk1n8 tham lnt, a ooh...8.t oonoeptlon. l3ut alDoe be 0021a14.
e.r8 his wo.rk an effo1't in metaph7alo8 ....atbe.r than me....e17 a pleoe
of hiatarloa1 .......a.roh. his next atep 18 to

pl'Oft

tJaat the oonoep.

'llon he haa &1'1'1v.4 at baa an ontol081cal ooate....:pu.-t.
.e"l'al _oofa

&.1'8

!L'hoUSh

oneoraa. ..e wl11 0011.14el' ot1l.7 the two

8148l.' tbe m08t tOl'oeftt1.

.e

0021-

1&

Jra.l'tshol'ne· iii Ontological

A1'gnJMllt 18

'baRd. on hia a.finS. tlon

otthe 41'f'tJte pa.rteotloxu "Goa cannot oanoelftb17 be su.rpusae4 or
equaUed br aZl,)' othel' uutl'f'1dual, 1"1" Ife can 8Vpa8. hlmeelt. alJA
thus lila aotca.al .'ate 18 not the Inateat possible

.ta,..

fh1s

s...

pli •• that tlte.re 18 po"entiaUt7 as well as a01n.11'7 in the d1'f1.l1e

.real1 '7. "18

fti8

CU..ffU8 n4loa117 fIt_ what ~tsho.me oalls the

.. claast.oal loot.f'ine." ill wUch G04 1.8 ,. UolU81vel.r aotl1A1."

!he

neoela8.1oal .reaeflnitton. h. .,..... 18 tn. t.rom tile 10810&1 Ittfs'.
O1I1t1•• of tke olaseloalJ ta.l-the.f', it s'8 no le •• a prlo.rS, (tllat 1.,

doe. Dot les_ tile

n808.81 'li7

of GOd' 8 e%lstcmoe) than , . olus-

loa1; OOllt1l1pnt »,0,.1"1". an predicated of Go4:", but !lot oontln-

,ent e21ateuoe. 2,
file Ill. . Goe1lent a 'being la. tbe peateI' potentlalltle. it

has, a man

0 . . . .81eot

'1118 oveel'

01'

that', 'but an ape

0 . . .'1. 80

G04 can o.ra..te thls ,,0.r14 o.r that. but 8UOh 18 not possib18 for
men. 31 'be olaa.loal
.re-.1n&d 1mo1lat1lea.

,,"'w hell ,hat no mattu nat Gel 414, ..

"On tbe ala.sieal

new,

allJ' othe.r wol'14 o.r

1 P

28autahOm&.

l'!I.!.l6Ii" !1 Pal'feotlop.

2~)14.

SOXbll.
81I):»1"..

p. 36.

p. 36.

.,

" . . . woa.14 _n .stull.ea the

tnowlease."·

T8~1

same at&te of 41'f1..ne 10'f'G

!he tn.th 1s that 1t G04 18 Pe.rteot Being, me pot.

eDtlalltle. a..re peate.r than th()sa. 01' an:T othel" betns.
powe..,-t~4e

ana

"~e 41't1.D1

18 absolllteJ.3r 1n.f1n1t.t or i8 all pow.... t. "'e."33 G04~

In taot'. ooiJlo14ee Wi til posaibilit7 !! arqoll- M 1l'! the same JII!lM.e.tr.
Be 00lnoS.48. tt1. til aotllall t7 1.8 such.

nia la oalle4 God' 8 ao4al

00uo14_oe,. Jfa 001l1014e. "I'-'lt. o.r Is. th. . . . . modea of 'belng
fMtuali tJ' Ulfl po....tl611 Q).
AOOW4iq to Beob...,,' a Postulate, JJa.rtsho.rne 078, " ••41.1 ataf:.
~8 OaB

be aftllaed 0... lentea in the moa. of ne.8salt7 on17,,,36

80

tllat Goi t • ulat. . . 18 not a 9;\18.f:1011 of oontlD8ent enatanoe

oppoaed t. oODtilllel1' noa-exiatenoe. but of
oDoaH to _oesaar,. l1on-eua"enoe ••'

De •••a&rJ

aSa "eno.

_ , If God is aotualt t7.

_at ooUld oon08t"""17 OauS8 tim to 08...e to euat' on17 that betns on Wbloh Be a.,.Ma to. Be extateDoe; but tf the...a i8 noh,
thls othe1" b8hs ia God. What oou14 0011oe2:rab17 oauae nm to exliat!. If m. 4088 Dot alnad.v exlet' J'o.r th1e .rea8011. to apeak of
~- o01'1tSnsent17..natil'll Pe.rteot Belns

p.

3'.

i4DI.~.i. p.

sa.

881"14,- t
~;td.!.

Hn&.t.
~'bl4.t p.

at.

8'1'Pl4,. t

so.

p.

is .a oOl'1f:1"adlo..o....'

&8

to

3'
apeak of the non-exist.ai Perfeot Being.

If PG.rteot lloUg 8.x18t.

oontingentl;. o.r does not enst, lie is not Perfeot Be1ng .. 88
The fo.nal

proof ie as follows:

1) I t Pen.at Beins eslsts, it necGaaa.:tl1,. aleta.

2) ISS.the.r lt l'lfHleasa.rll7 e:xlsts,

enet.

OJ'

it neci/uum.rl11 doeB not

S) If 1t necessarily does not exist. it 1s neoeGsarJ that it
nooes8al'Uy does not enst.

4) Thus. eithel' it neoeBaarl1;, exists, o.r it 115

n8(188_1"1

it doe8 not o%1st.

5) If ,the latter, then 1t ls

n()o(uUJS.~l

iha1

that it d.oes not exlst.

S) S0,. iteithe.r necessarily exists. or 1t 1s necessary that
1t does 1101; exist,
'I) We intuitivel,. know that l't 1s not necessuy that Pe.rfaoi

Being not e:dst (It 18 not Impossible).

8) Thus 1 t 18 Deoesea,z.-;v that it enst.
9) But 1f this 1s . cO', 1 t 8nats.
.

10) Pe..teo1 Belng. o.r God, ex18ts. 19
Step (1) does not -7 'that God's non-exlstenoe 1s oont!'ad1otOl':;.
but l"athe.r that If God ex1sts. lio must do so necessarily o.r lIe 1s
not GOd: so-oalled "Pertect Be1nS" whioh onsts oontingentlY' 1s 1n

l"oallt1 an !mpc~feot be1ns. 40
In su.mma.ry ;tC»:'nt, the 1l1*lfument atat&8 that 1) perfeot1on must
,

1

r

1t

Wi

3&rbid. See also the seotion ent1tled tlThe Inaompa't1'bl1ilY' of
Fel"feet~and Oontingenoy t~ pp.. 58-6a.

form.

3iJ;P,..ft.• Ji p_ 51. B'a.rtshOl"n8 gives th~ argument in symbolio

4O;rbld.
,

S8

necessarl1y exlst, if at all; 2) if non-existent, It is

necessarll~

so; 3) if nec.seari11 non-existent, perfeotion 1s imposs1ble; 4)

but e.rfeotlo:q .!! Eossible. 41

Vie

oa.n oohe.rentl.1 oonceive of Pel'-

feot Beins; we oan oonceive of God as Hutsho.rne has done.

feotion is not impossible, therefore It is DeOessarl.

5) Pel'-

God eXists.

This }artloule..r fo.rm of the Ontological Argument oannot be

used to prove the e:xistence of a God of the olas81cal type because
the 018881oa1 oonoeptlons are full Qf oontra410tlOl1s. or "para-

closes, tt th118 not ooherent17 co:ncelvable t the; do not show the non-

impo.siblli', of Goa·s existence:
Anselm' a Ilost nlne.rable assumption. so far as we
see, 1s his belief that tbe idea of an absolute ms.:rlmum of
.reatne88 1.8 oonslstently meanil1l!fU1, tbat posl tlnall is
noo.rreot. Row does he know "l!B%imal s.reatnesa" 1s not
81mllar to
numbez thall which none gl'eateJ." oan be conceiTed"' (No such maximal number 1.s concelvable.) onlY' a
sltghteffort is made by the gzeat Bishop to meet this
dlfficult1. that Is, to ~fute poeltlV1sm. ••• Indeed, 1t
1s hud to see how classical theism. with its pa.rado:xloal
view of delt" could ever establish the eonslstenc~ of lts
baslo 001'108,1;101'1. 42

t

Only

It.

the l'leoolassloal oonoep1;lon of God, tn whloh Be ooincides

with aotu.allty as suoh
conceivable. and so the

ana

potentiallt1 as suoh, 18 oohuentl;v

on1~

oonoeptlon

0: God

whlch oan use th1s

proof to show BS.s ex18tenoe.

4lIbid,., p. 52.
42lJal'tshorM and Re ese t Ph &l,os0E!!e.t:,s, SE!ak!!

GOd.

p. 103.
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All oontlnse:nt proposl tlons are .restrlot1Te: ..e always find
that "This ls the faot, instead

.2! that." Alternative possibtli-

tles oonflict one with tbe other and thus exolude the realization
of the others.
lble with

Some propositions, on the other

anr

hana,

"are oom]Jat-

poeltiTe and oonsistent assertion whatever, name11

necessary p.roposltlons."43 The existenoe of Perfeet Being 1s one
of these propositions. "(Iod exists"" 1s tolerant of any state ot
affairs. But GOtt's 1UliTe.real enstential tolerance, it may be objeoted. does not prove that God ex1sts. 44

Bartsho.rne answers that

If GOd's non-e%istenoe bas no posltive signifioanoe (te.r "God ex-

ists," as well as "God,eGes not exist."
1;&n08

1nte~8re8

with the 8xis-

of nothlll8 else). this non-e;g1.stenoe would be a pu.rel.v nega-

tlTe faot whioh oould in no way be ve.rlf1ed.

But a negatiYe faot

always asse.rta something posl tlTe; 1.t 1s only pat'tlall1' l"eetJ!'lotlT8
(unless lt 18 e false statement, 11lte "J'othlD8 ensts").

thie

SOmttthlng

What

is

pos1tlTe whlch 1s asse.rted by the absence of delty

which we coUld ue to ve.r1fy the statementt
a.rsument 1s as follOW'St a oontingent oonce])t is OM
whose uelll,Pll:tloatlon OJ!' non-exemplltioat1on 1s :possible. l} All
The

f~l

such comepts a.re pa.rtlally .restrlotl'f'e; that ls. theil' e:l'empllfl43lJaJ.'ts~OJmet. !l'he !:..w.~ .0.1. ;l!eJ.',~eot2:.ctl!. p.

'':t}d,a.

t

p. '10.

e8.

40

cation 1s 1ncompatible w1th some othel' po.sltlve poss1bll1 t7_

2)

The; oonoept of Pel'feot :Be1ng is wholl" non-.reet.rlotlve:, "1 t8 8:xemp,~ifloatlon being compatlble with 1ihe extstenoe

ot an; poal1ilve17
Jonoeiftble state of atfal.r'h"45 3) The oonoep1i ot Perfeot )3&il'l8

/

llilonoontill8en1i,
"God exists" is e1 tbel' impossible
/'

(Anselm's usigbt).

01'

neoessal'l

But "nothing is st1'101;11 imposs1ble 1Dlless 1t

1s 1l1he.ren1i17 oonva4ioto....7

01'

meaninsless."46 4} B&1'tshome's

oonoept10n ot God 1s ne1 the.... oont1"8410t01'7 nor taIltant,Dgles8; thereto.re God neoessa.r117 ex1sts.

Both thi8 p.roof and the Ontological P.roof. 1t m18ht be noted,

are based. d1.reotl), on an insisht or intuition into the natve ot
God: "Anselm'. lntu1tlon wsa that God exists 1n a supe.rlor 1lIU1l'1er.
the o.rdln.a.r7 'flay of ensting being a defect.""
i

U

d

I

' "'~,'"
.... b .. d.;
."

:troJ."' '.8th!. tntu..

•

p. '0..•

46tb~!.; see also P1>- 92.108.
47Bartsho.rntf, ~ ~S!C. Of Pe.r!eotlon, p •.. ·58•. -Reds Jol1'9'et.
lab!ed;. R.f. ieasoirTJtew !o.rlt; !iw~lio.t:11 !ooks. 1968). pp. 46-4'1i
lD&nl!O:ne eimIla.rU'lhat "the [ontological] altgument eeems to lap y
It t,he.rotlsh undeJ:fBt8J1dlng of the lJDler .req111.remente of the :1.4_ of
God'. of a betns in whom essenoe a.nd a:d.stenoe a.re not .real17 41stlnot and are onll one thins. 80 moh eo that he..... , com.ra.r1 to
what .18 t.rue of the .rest of .reall ty t to grasp an. es.senoe 1s equ1y.
alen:t to appZehendtns an ex1etehoe 111 .1t$ ,..111 nec.ssltr_ It i .
preoisely this point on whioh Desoa'1te"i"'1ia:s moe' Il1BIsted. aanng
·that his &l'gtunent does not start froll the wo.rd "God", but f.rom &
.real and obJeotive essenoe OJ.' nature t and henoe alwe.ye .remains.
fl"OJn 1ts begltm1ng (tbe natue of Goul tolte ftAt'ltt'1t11 1i1I on (the 0'1.·
tenoe of GOd)'. in the real orde.r. (See Descartes, J~.. . ;: au
P.rem1e.res obleotlons t seotion 12.) Wh6teTe.r -7 be Ii,,,n ~th.
d'al'iesraJi vIew,' '1!iI's 8S:p&ot of the ontological a.rsumel1t nakes 1t
cl.~ that 8t. Thoms who had refuted the ueelmiaZ1 ~oot beto!'.
Kant, was fa.r fl'Gm tahiBup a purely negat!Y. atti tail. towa.rda It.

1 tion put fOl'th as . . .thing rarely enoOlUlteHd, but .raihe.r as expe.rlenoe oOJllllon to all men. 48

:row

that we have outlined HartshoJ.'ne' e 'baaio phllosophy and

his philosophy of God!, we a..re in a position to of'iel' aome or1t1-

clam.
T

,

. . nt

_,

• • "\

if the asseJ.'tl0zf, "Go! ·enstsn , he _78', :1.8 not and oannot be a
El'l~e evidenoe foJ.' 11B, in itae1fl that ls, f.rom the standpoinT
of 1'1 t God's nature demands it s eY1deznthat God exists, since
eS.sence and enstenoe belng identioal in hh1, he oannot not exist."

0' mIs

B'arishornet, Befond Ba:mll.nie~ pp. 284-285; quoted in
Ohapte.r I. note 46 (p.
l'lieale.

4:8of.

rr

OlIAPTER III

A. lIE!l!A.PJII8IOAL OPTIONS

!WO :proble_ aom1ua.te 1TA.l'tehome I e :ph11osoPh11 f!..rs1f. h. oan

we haTe a meatdDsfrll ,,"pb1s1os: seoondi• bOllf 00 we epaaJt

ful17 about G04' Sinoe

_ta~sloe

_an1ng~

18 an eftort to speak about

al~

of .reality \Ultle.r 80~ unita.rl' aspeof. ana s1JlO8 God 18 at leut a

pa.rt of that .real1 t7. his ph11oeopbJ' of God 18 intlmatell' oOnt1ectel

with and depenlent on hls bul0 _-Ph!vsloal p081tions.

This RIa.

tl01UJld., holas t.ru.e especially 111 .....gard to Ba.rtshom.'e _ihod of

prooedue.

In B!I,lond l!u!@!d:slI. 'lore_aple', .. .read that ph1loso-

phi besll'l8 with obee.na.tlOl1 of eellsible reality_

wAe _n loolta

0111

upen the .o.rldl• he .eee ••• the animals••• the p1ar.tta••• lno.rgan1o
01:l3&ot8.,,1 !1te phl10soPhe1' f1n48 that
,

olasses of eXlstel1te,"2 oJ'Sam.o

ana

-the". aeem to be

ll:l.Orpnlo thlnse.

two g.reat

Appa.rel1t17.

t18 metapJuraioal effart is stiflea at the beSixmlltg; "allt,. do.s

Dot preeent 118 wlth a 1Ullta.ry aS18ct which mlsht be SAsped, explored, enlar,ea upon to gift one bod7 Gf latOWladS8 about all
•

I

...

•

lOharle8 lra..r.tahoma, :se,ona mu-nlem( Ohlo&80 and . . York,
Wlllett, Ola.rk and Oompa.D7, 13", p. tIL
2Ib 1.4•

,

lnat.aI? ..8 'llnd a baste 41,,181021 1n "eallt7_

tbbaaa.

At tMe
"8 OaB

'JOin".

proo.ed.

t7P8 o.r

OlaS8.,

.8

then

81'8

two optlcma.,...

on the one haD8:.

BartW.ftl8 doe., to .re4uoe all r.&1I.:_ to

0l'1.

Be ..e:ma.rm that'" the". are lood reasons, howen",

to.r tJat.:atlDf! that 1l1orsam..u a.re a1mp17 &88ft8&t•• of

,..,t. ole

.... tlae• •l ..... 0.raet..... ,,8 Slnoe . . . tkiDs. are 01l1'101l817 DOt

O!'IWO. ao ......Ol'1able . . wOUld .&7 tltat the,. uel but l' 18

qut.
the,

80

o'bnoua that tlte.. tld.DlS are G.tt.re17 blarp.rd.o.

&1'. 00llpo. .4

of o.r,alo pa.rts.

DO'

Pe.rhaJY

P• .rhapa thel' the.elves are

])&l'ts of a lus",. 1110"'8 lJlolustft Hall t1 whloh 18 0I.an10.

home 'Ulan _GOea48 t. flail .1'_1110_1 81'_I1'S to _pport

Jlu't...

a ••

supposltions ... ooul114•• 'llat 81lOh a.nlnte.rp.re"'tlo1'1 of ...eallt,.
18 poaa1ble.
Bu.' l ' .nal17

oup' to

be aattt. 111 GnUoS.. of 'Ma, t]at

the t.raeltion l.r_ the p08albUlt7 8t noh an lDterpre.tlO1'1 to

tt8 _0•••lt7 .reat. on

w.

aa81l1lPtlo;ns.

De ft.ra' t8 that we 40

no' tala1t7 01U!' YlalOJl of .rea11 "7 b,. ueatl:ns t1dn•• as tholtlh
aU fell lata . . 01&8..

the~

rue d8l:Ulptlon is e.peo1a117 _.1'4...

slue . . an OOd.ronte4 at the ou'••' wt. at l ... et two olae_. of
thinS-, U. a.nSma'h &D4 the bani.'-. anA

alsh' ••"....1

nhe,

f..D.'ftetl,atlon

Plants, fv example, .8e. to
be b ...loa117 liff.,e.' f.ro. ant_le._d raUl f1'om o,he.... au1rra1e, tc
_,. nothing of ,_ alatino'lon otten pos1'.d betw••n _tulAl uut
I

b

It

*

olaa.8 u "ell.

ruth."

l . .te~l bes.nslh
!he vs.eWJOint that woUla .reduce all t1d.ngs to. oneolass, as

Ba.rtahom.e 1lfoUlll do. impllcl t17 aftl.rme that 1*ea11 t7 oannot be reduced to oonoeptual un!. t1' 1U1les8 we ttJ>st tln4 somethlXl8 111 all

J>ea1 thins. to Be"e as a basis tol' thla conoept

01'

. t of con-

eept_. lUll.aa ..e tll'st tlnd some essential cha.raotel'latio8 oommon
to aU thlng., ~ impose such cha.racte1"lstlos on them, in the eYen
,

of lack ot olear GY14enoe.

trow this 1s quite 001"1"80t; suoh a pro-

cedve. to 'be auoo8ssful:, has illat neoess&r7 preoondl tton. But
hOW 18 the :pIrOGedure Itself justifled?

thlngs that woUld allow u

to afflrm that its eoncep_l uni t7 ls

possible' HartShorne operates 1n

he til'st
ible.

eoneeptua~l,.

?Jhat do we flnd in real

~the.r

a oi.raular Bannel" heze;

1U11tles ....ea1it,.. then 8als t.t 1t 1s P08S-

13,· possible,· howeYcu:,", he oan onl7 mean that 1t 18 posslble

&s a h1uaan ao1;lY1ty, not as a t.rue and valld 1nte1"pretatiOl'1 of
.reallty.

:lro.- if he meant "posslble" in this latte... sellSe, he

woulc1 111*s1; llave to lnvet'rU.gate that questlon and ask, ·What 1s

tlle.re in .real 'Ud.l'188 that leads me to balleve that they are all
melib"8 of one 01&88' Is thel'e aotuall; a;a.vthlng, 01" has

J1'CV

de-

sl" to know .r8.11ty unAe.... some unlta.rl' aspeot been guIded in the

• .rong 41reot10Ji. a dueotlon mol'e au1 ted to the ph7810al 801entlat
. Am I not oontu.e1ns the method propel' to pbJS108 wi. th the method

pzope.r to metaphyslosf'

If Hartshome could

a.tlS1'Ie1'

that welSht7

ertdenoe led him to beUeve all things we.re membe.rs of one olaS8.
well and 10Od, but since he finds that .reallt7fo.rme at least two

45

olasses, the organio and the lnorganic, 1 t is doubttttl prooedue tc
torm the hYpothesis that all inorganl0 things are somehow organlo,
oonsolidate tbe notion, and argue from that basia that
only one olass.

the~e

may bE

The faot that he has made this interpretation doeE

not mean thBt the p,rooedUl'e is valld.

The neoeSS&l"; oondition for

the statement, "All reality may be organle," is the sta:tement, "AIJ
reality rna; fall into one olass" _. whioh, as he notes, is
dleted by experienoe.

oont~a

For this reason, interest1ng as 1t ls. h1s

metaphysios oan be no moze than a hypothetioal construction wl thoni
any solid founBation in reality.
But havins aooepted this" one...class" interpretation of reality, Hartshorne prooeeds to say that Onll

l!!

set! of charaoteris-

tios could possibly be used as metaphysioal variables, or oharacteristics whioh oould be pred.ioated of all things: the first is the
set of var1ables emplo18d 1n physios; the seoond, those employed 1r.
oomparative psyohology.

(These seem to be oorrelative with the twe

great classes of existents, the inorganio and the organic.)

The

patent impossibility of using the first eet 1n metaphysics arises
from the fact that some things are organiC

ana have psychological

oha.raoterlstios; but, in alldlt1on, Ibrtshozne sta.tes that the first
set. those used in physios, "are not a d1fferent set" fram those
~sed

in psyohology, "but the same set with oertain aspeots al-

tered.*,4

Be

'Ibid.

argues that "the space-time structures deal with by

46

physios, beil'lg the dynamio patterns of the \vor14, do not of themselves answer the question, Patterns of what?'

A2!.

reality interaots. but not

clude that

It

w~a~

Physios tells us

reality is.

Thus we must oon-

the 'psychic' Tariables ••• are simply all the variable!

with unlimited range,"S

and alone qualify for applioation to a

reality with a Similarly unlimited range.
The second option open to the prospeotive metaphysioian faced
with an apparent dichotomy in the things of experienoe agrees with
Hartshorne's inSight that "all va.riables. whatever else they nay
be. must be va.r1ables of hunan eXpel'lenoa."6 and that "it is not
the funotion or within the oapaoity of external peroeption to te1l

us

wh8:~

things are. but onlY' to tell us where they_ •• are. in how

small or large an area. and how they

aJ.-S

ohanging their .relative

pOSitions. It '1 But the Tieli \vh10h we affirm interprots this latte.!'
statement differently than Hartshorne does.

He says that sinoe ex-

ternal peroeption does not tell us what things are, the only

oonr~

open is to turn to internal perception ("self-peroeption, intuitiVE
g.!'asp of the lUli tary nature of our experience" e

>.

generalize on 1.ta:

essential oh&.raoterlstloa and apply them to all things. 1n order tc
5lbid.

SIbid.
"Oharle$ Hartshorne, "Pannsyoh1sm," in A HistOl.'t of Phl1osoEhloalSlstemeJ. edt Vergillus Fem (lJew York, 1J1i1!oaop ical*miarl.
t§l>d). p. ;ab.

.

Bxb1d •

4'
haft a metaph,Jslcs.

(Apin, extel'.l pe.roept 10n seems to be oo.r-

.relat1ve with 1no.rgan1c th1nge and the 1"&I1ables of phys1os, InterDal pG"oeptlan with o"gan1o th1nge and the PGJoholog1oal

~

ables.) !!'h1e 18 tne 0Dl.7 1f estel'nal p$l'oeptlon 1s oonside.red 1n
1solatlon

~om

man's othel' oognit1ve powe"., notab17 the intelleot

111 the oon01"ete s1tuat10n. howeY.". men know tlWl8s nth both the
1ntelleot ana theu se_ee. know thil18s pe1'oeptual17 and 1nte11eo-

tuall7 at 'the . . . tlme. 1'l11e sort of knowledge doe8 tell

\l8

what

thinss &.re and "emows the neoessltJ' of loold.ll8 fol' Ute "1'1hat" of

things b7 oompa.riJ18 them with the 1ntl11t1"17 lalO\U1 human essenoe.

au..... prooedne rill show this "" a.rl'S:v1J18 at a set of Ya.rla'ble
applloable to

all~h1118s

but Bot deJ.'1ved t.rom the seJ1eft.l ohuao-

'e1'1st108 of bDman eXp&l'lenoe (as Baztsho"De'. are).

All th1nge are ob1"1oo17 Bot JnEuibe"s of one olass. Aooept1na
thls essential 41eslmllu1 t7 of thll'lSs. we oan ask 1f the"e 18 not

sometld.ns mo"e bas10, mo.re fmtdamental. th&u the essenoes
tMDSe.

Of

ftoqh thls questlon has p,robab17 .raGelft. "nd' :to&" an

anewal' JDaJO' times 1n the past, '-'hOMe Aqll1.:r1as states aff1.ltJBtS:"el1
that a thlll8' s exlstenoe 18 more tu.:n4amental tha.a 1 t8 e ssenoe,
mon basl0 to a thins than what it

1~.

1s the faot that 1t

.L"

fhis 1s so beoa.use lU'11ass a thlng ls,. 1t oaamot be tld.s 01' that.

o.rptd,o o.r lno.rsan1o, A metaph7sios whioh ptooee4s trom the faot

ot a thins'e existenoe does not eliminate the o.rSanio-1norSan1o

dlchotomr we

enoounte~ed

at the beglnnins

or

our

lnveatlgatl~.

but, while l"esp1)otlng it, goes beyond it.'
This mtaJ>h7alos can.

t~

example, dzaw these oonolusions

abon t J:'eall t11 sinoe both olAsses at thinss enst. they shaft in

the qualities ot goo4ms., t.ruth, unity; because theyex1st in. a.

11m!.ted

~". •

.ratioml nectessi tles dictate that the;, .ve a ,oa.

for both the1.r enste'llOe and the llm1tedmss of theu ex1stenotGs.
These oharaoterlstlcs, whlle oertainly being applioable to

or~o

things. a.r8 flot 11m1 ted to them, but oan be applied to inorpn:1c

things as well. B7 going be:lond
ph;Vs10s

oa.:n

tm essenoes at

thblss, a met..-

be establlshed whloh does not .reduoe all .reallt,. ttO

olass; thls mtaph.ysics,

:ra.r.e.r:rDO.l'G.

need not take as a atpp0J81 ..

tlon that .reality.!!Q be .redalce' in such a way, fv 1t

b~n)c!UuJe.

that proaedve.

:r..et

u "turn fo.r a moment to

OQ.\'

sta.rtlng point.

our pt'tOble

ls the aam.e as IfA.rtshorne's ... Bow 18 a .uLl'llfl8f'a.l metapb,ys1cB
90t. thomas Aquinas, S!estle>nes DtsPTlatae De Potent~a. n l
2, ad 9; tZ6fl8latea b7 James . ' .
In l'if.r§!uoWn '''0-''.ta . S 08 of at. ~Aq1d.Das (Ohlcago. JiU7 lesner,-, l~
p_
: '
Oiil 8ase ~s among all prlno1plee the moet pe.rfGO\'
hlah Ie en,dent troll He faot that aot 1s r;.lwa18 mol'e pe.rteot
thaD potent1a11 t7_ NoW. B.D7 deslgnated tom 18 un481'stooil to .:det

me!'8.

t-r

aotuall), only In Y1,rtue of tbe taot that It Is held to be. Tba&r.
h'l1mfU11 tl" or 'lue oan be oo1'1e1d8.r84 as enst1ng in the pole1'1t1alU. t7
of matter. 01' as eXS,st1nB 11'1 the acttye power 0'1 an asent ~ a180
as exist1ns in an intelleot. But that whloh hae eese ls ,£.e aotbual
1. t;v of all acts, ana for this reason 1 t 1s the perfection of alll
perfections. Bor 1e it to be thought that somethtns 18 added tCD
hat I oal1 eese ftS.oh 1s mo.re formal than esse ltself. thus leter
ln1ng 1. t as an act detend.nee a potentialt tJ'e For the ease I ESp
of Is eaeent1.al17 otheJ:' than that to wh10h 1t 1s added a8 a oe.tal
eteJ:'mln1ng pr1nolple."
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possible' Kow mot we pr ooeed if we wish to know and apea.k of all
reality 1n the light of some unitary aspeot?

are both oonfron-

We

ted with the awful variet,. that .real things display. and yet oan
That
metaphysios and Hartshorne's differ is due to his chooslng features of

both sense that there 1s some oommon denOminator.

ow:'

one segment of reality. the o1"ganio segment, and predicating them
of the ret.Bin1118 segment', the ino.rganio, while we think 1 t bette1*
to respect the obvious va.riet,1' of real things and seek an element
of unity in an ortle.r mo.re basic than. thst of the essences of things
of oar experience.
The latte1" procedure bas these aavantages.

First, pre4ioatins

similari ty of all things on the plane of their existenoe f rather
than of theu essence,allows us to sp3sk 41r8c1:17 of all things.

Hartsho.rne oannot talk rman1ngfully sbout .rooks and oha11's exoept
insofar as they are either oomposed of organic pa1"ts 01" are parts
of a more ino1usive organl_.

This can be oompa..red to being able

to speak about huma.n beings only insofar as they are members of a
gl'OUP

or a..re oomposed of different membe.rs and parts.

To say that

a stone 1s oompoaedof organisms is to speak d1.reetly about the
stonets pe,rts, only 1nd1.r8ot11 about the stone.
~andf

But on the othe.r

all things whioh exist oan be spoken of d1reotly 1n a meta-

physios whioh takes existenoe as tbe most basio aspeot of .reality_
8eoond, it we ventv6 a bit fu.rthe.r into this roota.physios thall
its starting pOint, we come to a realiZation of tbe .relationship of
essenoe and existenoe.

We

realize that even if we we.ra to find 1n
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real! t1 some oommon essential oha.racterl.stic. we would still be
fa.ced wlth the deeplJT uoubllng problem. "How is it that thette

&re,

things composed of essenoe and enatence. sinoe a oomposed being of
thls 80.rt cannot be the

S01U'OO

of its own oomposition?

beil'18 whose axis tenee ls quallfied eYe.r oome to be

r

How oan a

Vie see the. t

"to be" and "to be organio" are not ooextensive and begin to wondel"
what 80.rt of beillg must be
It

~s:ponslble

to be" of the things we expe.rienoe.

fOJ: the limlts:tlon of the

:But a metaphysics built on

oommon essential ohar6ote1"istlos cannot dee.1 with this s01"t of
tp,roblem; it can only say

"{h~t

things Me, not

they a.re.
1 t does not e%pIO" the faot that
,
~tsho1"ne's

!tl!l

they 8o1"e, beoause

A metaphysios like

oannot deal with oel"taln quite basio philosophioal

tp.robleme.
Th:Lrd, IIa1"tsho1"l1&'s netaphyslos .rests on the assumption that
the only variables available

tOl.'

pred.ioation of all th1ngs a..re

those of oomparative psyohology ana of physios (wbloh 81"e a YB.rie.nt
form of psyohOlogy·s).

But we have seen that by golns beyond the

whatness of things (thoir oree.nioity or non-oJ.'gan1o1 ty. in this
case) and

oons1de.ri~

them simply so far as thel exist It anothel.' set

of v&.rables is discovered, tho erlstentlal va.rlablee.

~ie

oovel.'Y makes Rartshome 1 e dlohotomy non.exbaustiveand allows

d1811S

to

[d isagl.'eo with his statement that tm psychic ?e.l.'iables a.re the onlll

ones with unlimited range and supl.'ome flexibl11t1. 10 Even

mol'S

sc
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oan we deD7 his wppositlon that unless some aet of essential ohau!
aote~istlos

is predloable of

eTe~yth1n8.

metaphyslos 1s lmposslble

toz the Yarlables we have pointed out belong to a th1Dg slmply be.
oanse it esista, not beoauM it u1sts in this o.r that pa.rtlculu
ma:rmel', whethe.r that

lJJl.l'lJ'l81'

be o.rganioal17. non-orssl'l108lly. or

what have you.
The Vpe

of 'UJ1$.ty wblch ou nataph,valos flnds in .reality is

not this aimple 1Ul1ty of one olass ws,tb
t.DUOUD

~

membe!'s, but the more

unity of a multltude of th1D88 Whioh are slm1lal' to one

anotbar onlr 1bsof.ar as thet.r oharacte.rlatlos are proportional to
thet.r aot of ex1stll11.

!rhat ls, they are like each othU' inset.....

as those oJaraoteristlcs whloh make them to be what they

&.ret

in

the sense of beiDg full), oonorete indl1'lduals. beal' a .relation to

-

the fact t_ t they.a.N eUQb ana
,

8110h

fu.l1y oonorete 1ndi1'1duale.

We are dealing. in othe, wol'cte. with a umt),-in-mltlpllot.ty whloh
finds both terms in .reality.

Whe.reaa "ani_te stones" anti "antmat

plantS- aobieve a real mnltipllo1ty (doge are not stones. no.r is
one stone anoth.!' stone );. but only

&

oonceptual or abstraot tD11t7.

the "'beautlful. apple." a.nd the "beautiful stonea" aohieve a ",_1

1U11tl as well.

Fol' the, aohie'" an amlogous unit7: the beauty of

both i8 not a JD1.raouloual7 mltlp118d 14entlt7. but a beau.t,., share
in tn proportion to those thll'l8s'

uar1ns

in the faot of be1ng.

81noe this oondlt10n or state of atfa1.r8 obtawe 111 ,..&11t7, a t

me1ur.ph7sioe mst take aooount of 1t ana OJlly assign things this
ana1oloua t7P8 of unit,._

The question whether all th1llgs are mem-
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eN of Ol1e olasa 18 thus allSWel'ed wi th a • no·. and w1 th 1 t the

furthel' asael'tion that the psyohological variables

a~

applicable

to, all things.
Th1s taklns aooount

ot the analogous 11111 ty

of thlDga haa lm-

pOl'tant oonsequenoes. Although lt is otten neoessar,. to speak of
thinee as thOllBh ". we.tte atUlbutlnS oha.raoterlstloa to them in the

same sene.., mthe.l' than as pl'opol'tloned to the various deSNes of
pa,t'tlolpa tlOll of theee thlnse In ene1;811Oe. we GuSht not to 10_
aight

o~

a suoh.

our

that~

the faot that 'thls Deoeeslt7 ilON. t.l"om la.Jl81l8088 and
~.

gow1e4&t

doea not aoo't1.ftJ.tillJ' m1..l'.ro.r .real! t7' "'.1.'1;1181888.

_at be

~otU-ate

:In thl. nsart.

Both dOS8 and men

.re allT&, for esample _ but we caMot .reason trom th1a that the
lfa prope.r to euh la of the aame tJ'pe.

fte 0'baervatl011

.~

thls

p.rlnelpl.e will be espeoiall,. important in spaakiq about God, sinoe

s e::latol'1Oe liftsZB so .radloally f.rom that of fItoIQ'thlns else.
o. XlrOWLEDGE OF GOD TImOUGB PROOF FOR BIS EnSfE.NOE

Bal'tshOl'De &nswers the seoond sreat problem of hia

ph1losop~.

Bow oan we speak meaningful17 about G04 l' slODS tho ..me 11nes as
the fur..'_

lie l'easol'lB that if all 1'eal1 t7 oan be spoken of mean-

lngfu117 onl7 lnsofu as 1't bear. 1'$soDibl811oe to lntul ti:".17
:amall expel-ienoe. God oan be no ezoep't1oD.
OtO.r18t10

o~

mown

If an easentlal. Ghar-

h1UJlU1 oxparlenoe 1. to antloipate ana 'to .remanbel' t

hen (Jod also must antioipate 8Di "member.

ethel' ohal'ao'tennlos.

!.he same holds tn.

0
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B.evel', a oonsistent app11cat10n of 'theal tel'l'lBtlve we have
proposed to lIat'tshome' 8 philoso1lh1' deanda that we tust know the.
Goa exle ts befo.re we ean sal" anJ1;hlns else about Blm.

This olear

follows from the prlnciple that thlngs exh1b1 t an analogous unit1
in

the .relation of thell' oharaoterletioe to the mea81U'8 of thell'

:r!.stence. If somethlng does not exist, it does not en1b1t the
exlstent1al var1ables at all, 1f 1t e21sts 1n a 11DltGd mauner, 1t
xh1blts them in p.ree1eely that 18l'tlou1ar 11mlted ma.nnar, and so
on.

Jr. when we oome to speak of God, 1t 1s qu1te essential that

ls, if we

e know 3ust what lt1nd of beins •

to be justified

&.I.'e

sannS that a.t1.1 statement about Rim 1s l'eal17 meaninSful.
In wllat -.mtel' does God exlst? fbe ft.l'st d1fft.ou.lt7 enoOlln-

te.red in answel'1D8tl1!.s'. 18 the faot that we
see stones ana hONes.

do

not see

GoB. as

In faot, though we - 7 belleve Be atsts,

e do not 78t know tbat thie ls so.

,~

two reasons, then, GoI's

exls tenoe DIlat be"demonstl'ate4, ftl'st.. so that we -7 know
exlets; seoond, so that we oan know, l1"om the p.roof to.r
teno.~,

1!l ~he:t maane.r

mentioned above tells
of lts edatenoe 1n
pos1tlonls the

we

lie alsts.
118

80me

so~oe

fte &_17818

l!!!!

me

He

ens-

ot oompoeed belngs

that thls eart of belng must have a cause
being who ls not so eomposed.

Sinoe oom-

of 11mltation, this oause of limitea be1ngs,

GOd. e:rle "s III all 1l1111m1 ted manne.r.

Thus to speak meanlngfllllJ'

bout GOdi • we must take &Gooet of the taot tot whatever 18 pred10ated of

Him

1s e2Mbl ted by

H1m

1n

an 1Il111mi tea

JJaJme.r.

bs we sal' that "God ls good," meaning that., 18 8001. wlth-
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out a.ny qualifloation o.r limitation on that goodness.

We know that

He 1s good beoause whateveR eXists has this onaraoterlctl0.
means "4e81.l'&ble."

"Good"

If we ask wbat 1t is that is desired or o011ght

atter (b7 men. dogs, ravens. o.r what haTe

you'. we might give a

li8t of the many 8J'ld Tarious things whioh _oh seekEh

In general,

however, we oan say that that whioh exists 1s desired {and so is
desirable l, that whioh does not e::rist is not desired.

fllis latter

statement implies that the tbing does not e:rist in any way It e1 ther
in realitY' or in someone' s mind.

We oan verify this bl oonaiderins

that whaten .... is desired either exists or is thought to enst, beoause the onlY' al terns. i l va would be the absurdi tY' that someone o.r
sormtl't.J.ll8 desires nothing.

But this is equivalent to sa.;ving tha.t

someone or something does not desire.

Thus that whioh exists is

desirable'. or oapable of being desired {and', given the fact that
there are beings who des1.re, some thi:ngs among those that exist
are actually des1.red " and what does not exist is not desirable.
Further, this c1esil'abl1i t7 is propol'tloned to the deg.ree of partiolpation of the c1eslrable thing 1n existenoe (insofar aa the being
who d8Sil'8S is awal'S of that degl'oe of pa,rtloipation).

The thing

which pBl'tiolpatss mol'e in existenoe can contribute more to the
belng tiosil'lng it if it is attained; again. it oan be known to a
g.l'eater extent (since its being exhibits more knowable aspeots thsn
a lesser being does) and thus arOUS6 a 8J:'eater des1l'e.
example, is more

desl~able

Wisdom, for

than sensual pleasure, oonsidel'ing both

these things as they are in themeelTes and not as theY' nJiY

01' may
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not be known to be desi.ra.ble to partioular indIviduals.

If, then,

as we have pointed out, God is not me.rellT a p8l"tloipant in existence, but rath91* is Existence I tse1f, He 113 the most desira.ble
thing the1*e is 01* oan be, sinoe attainment of God Will enrioh the
being of the one attaining Rim to the gl"eatest possible extent,

OJ."

the moat pe.rfeot manner possible. ana because God exhlblts mo.re

knowable aS180ts than any othe.r aotual or posslble thins and can
thus 81*OU89 an "1nflni teft desire in us( that ls, a desire for the
Infinite).
But this is not all that oan be meant 1n sa71ng that God is

gooi", far we are not dealing he.re with Just another

thing that par"

tlo1pates in existence and tbus exhlbl t.8 the exis tential ftJ.'1ables
in a certain fashion.
01'

I f we analyse the notlon of partioipation,

ask what 1. t meatJ.s to be a ];Srtic1pa.ted being,

\Y9

see that It

involves more than sh81'1118 in various deg:.ree8 in the formal ohS1"aotel'i8tl08 1nVolTecl in some notion.

It thls W9l'e so.

otU.'

us"a-

phy'sics would differ from liartsho.rne' s in oDly two respeots: :til'st

we have chosen

8,

notion, the Judgment of eXistence, as our sta.rtini

point, while he has ohosen

8.

sot of oomepts of e. cel'tain type;

seoontt. we oonceptual!se this notion In the existential variables,
whIle he uses the psychologicsl variables.

Aotually. ht7N9Ver. a

filUoh more fundamen"al distinction is involved.
1.48t us return to the pl'oviotts oonside.ration ot lim1ted beings
we say they al'e limited because thail' existence is "not infinite":
thel enst in

8110h

a.nd such a. manne.r t but do not exlst abaolnte17
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OJ.-

without Q.W:lllflcation.

To rea.son from this fact to the necess-

arY' existenoe of a being whose existence is not lim1ted involves
muoh more. ot oourse, than

th~

assertion that things oomposed of

existence and a limtt of existence require something unlimited in
existence to do the composing o.r lim1ting.

It imrolY6s. for one

thing, BD analysis of the notion of e21stenoe.

We ask, "Ie exis-

tence an 'aativi t1" whioh by lts verg natu8 implies some lim1 tation of that aoilvity in whateve.r it may be found?"

If we truly

have existenoe in mind. ani! not some fo.t:m of existenoe whioh of it
nature is limited CDlte.r1a.l

e~istencef

foz- eample}. 1t can be sa

that the faot that a thing exists doea not Ou.ry w1 ill it the fact
that this thing eXists as limited.

This oan be oompared to the

ore limited oomept of rationality: nothil'l8 within this conoept
implies that rationality will be limited to those things which a.o-

tually exist and aze

~&t1ov~.

In this example. two oonsequences

allow: first, there coSld be a potontlsJ.ly 1nft.nlte number of
aiions,l things; aeoond, the llm1tation of .rational things to this
particmlar number of

tt

.rationale" is not due to the intrinsio nee-

ssl tles of tlle oonoept iteelf.

Sim11e..rly \d.th the notion of bei

Sime nothing in the notion itself implies that existents exist as
1m! ted. two oonsequenoes follOW: first;. aormthlng outSide of them

s .responsible for their beine 11111.1 ted.

:xlstent who exists w1thout 11mit.

This oould onlY be some

Seoond;, since 1t would mez-ely

e pla71ng with fiords to say that limited things fust existed fU1tt
then W9re limited in the1.r eXistenoe, the verl faot that they exist

5'
must also be asoribed to the unlimlted existent.

In other words',

sinoe eXistenoe and esse.noe are not two rarts of a being but 'two
aspeots, quite inseparable in reality, the u.nJJ.mited existent is
the oause of the (lim1 ted) existenoe of Anita beings.

on

this

ground we oan asorlbe to God the charaoteristios of the being He
oauses, as the cause of these ohe..raotaristios.

We oould, for ex-

ample, also say that God is good in the sense that He is the oause
of goodness in all limited beings.
BetlYeen OUl.' nstaphysios and lIlrtshorne f s, then, lies this dif ..

ferenoel in hiS, the p8!"tioular things of *ioh the psychologioal
'Variables

t.iU8

pred1cated share in those variables ol1JJr aooording

to formal causality.

In ours, hONeve!", the

V81"1

reasoning in-

volved in oomingto a. knowledge of God's existenoe .re'Veale H1m as
existential oause.

Hs.rtshome has deoided that God e::d.sts as a. limited being and
predioates the psyoh,ologioal 'Variables of am aooordingly.

After

he has done this in a logioally ooherent rne.nner and wi th an e1e to

make Him the most .Perfeot Being in a "religious sense," he puts
forth a. formal proof for Bis existenoe based on the oonoeption of
Godha has thus oonstruoted.

we ha'Ve proposed, he has

But in the light of the

metap~yeios

no right to say anything about God until

Rie eX'istenoe 1s established.

If, for example, lJartahome says

that "God is good," what real meaning does this hl3.ve? Knowledge

of Godls mode of existenoe 1s the primary and basto prerequisite
for predioa.ting &1\1 attribute of Rim, for lt is only from this
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knowledge that we learn what kind of being lIe 1s and oonsequent17
ssy anything mean1ngtul abau t Hirn.

We can illustrate this dif'f'e.l'enoe in method between the two
metaphysios by oons1de.ring two problema whioh ltLrtshorne uses to
9,rgue against the notion of an aotually infinlte GOd: his analYsis
of knowledge, and h1s oonoem that God be ".religiously" pe.rfeot.

Knowing is a reJa ti on of the thlJlS known and the knower in
~h1oh

the knower 113 reall1 .rela. t1 ve to and dependent on the thing

~own.l1

Since God knows all th1.ngs

am

mov/s them complete17. Be

~s the

most dependent being, the most .relative. 111 .regard to knowl-

~dge.

If, fe.r example. God haa created a different un1ve.rse than

~be

one :He actl.'U41j! has o.rested, He would know that universe in-

~teaa of' this one and thus sustain a dif'te.rent relationsh1p.l2
This, Bl.rtshol'l'l6 inters, pointe to a

:ani te Goa.

HCI'I6Ver. it oan be argued that lJirtshome's diScussion of
knowledge does not tell us vl.b.at knowleage as suoh 1s;ho rathe1"

states oharacteristios whioh sonetim9s attena knowledge, speoifi-

cally, .real relativity aDd real depenaenoe.
~n

The first ta8k, then,

l"etuting this argument is to give a mare lnto..!'Ilat1ve daso..rip-

~lon

of knowle dge.
llBartshoms, The, Dlv1l'lE! Rela,t1rttz. p. 8.

l2Of. ~.t pp- 12-15.
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\1e oan say that it is a vital sctivi ty by wld.ch the oha.racte.r-

istics of anothe.r being (including in this last te.rm the

knOW'61'

himself when he knows himself o.r is the objeot of his knowledge)
a..re present to, o.r possessed by, the one knowing, in an lnmate.rlal
o.r non-physioal manner, preoisely as the oharaoteristios of the
othel' being.

"Pl'esent In an iI:'lm9.terlal mannel'" means that the

oluu.'aeterlstloa whioh are known. do not beoome oha..ractol'lstlos whiob
oan be atil'ibuted to the knowel', e.g•• a man eeeins a .red wall

possesses .red, but not in Buch a mannel' that we oould say that he
ie .red, o.r e. .red man.

"As the cha.raot&rletios of the othel' being"

emphasises the faot that the cha.raote.rietlos .remain p.redioable of
the thins known, but not the knowe.r, and points out that in thoae
knowers capable of aome sort of .refleotlon o.r aelf.awareness. these
cha.raotel'istios a.re .recognised &s belonging to the thing known.
"Possession o;tt' and "present to" must remainsoD'8what tmdefined,
but theil' 1l'lumlng oon be asoertained f.rom the simple e:x:pe.rienoe of
knowing.

In genaral. we oa.n say that these terms signify a pa.rt1-

o1patlon in the being (b7 way of formal 0811sa11 tll of the thing

known.

Effioient oau.sa1i ty ls exolud ed 'beoause knowledge 1s a

vital aotivity (although there rtay be effioient oausality involved
In the reduction of finite knowers f.rom potential to aotual knowledg8) •

Oan God have knowledge?
~aot

That God knows is oonsistent with the

tbat He 1s E:xlstenoe Itself.

~:lCoellent1y

We find. first, that the m01'e

a. being partiCipates in existence. the mere exoellent
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is his knowledge It for higher types of beings know things both mol'S
complete17 and in a Simpler mlnne.r than lower types.

A nan can

know something about all plants by mans of a oonoept, but a lower
anizral onl.1 knows something about those plants it has sensed.

A-

gain. a ma.n oan know that all plants g1ve off oxygen, but a 10we.l"
ani_l oa.n fo.rm no universal judgments about them.

On these

grounds, God shoUld know things more oompletely and more simply
than any other being.

Seoond, we note that nothing in the des-

oription of knowledge moesaarily implies that the knower be a :tini te thing; "partioipation by way of f0l'1rB1 oausal1 t1 1n the othar

tbeill8's ohat'aotel'istios'" does not imply finitude because the oans~11 t1

known.

involved do es not imply .real depend enoe of the klu'lier on the
In finite thingS, the.re 1s 'Chia dependenoe.

lie possesses the fQ\"t.n8l Chs..raotenstlos at· t . thing

In God's case,

as ther are

frlrtuaJ.ll" oontained in B10 own being, and thus thel'e 1s no need :tOt'
rthem to be oaused in H1m b:9' the thing known.

Indeed. sinoe Goa is

rthe oodsten1:1eJ. cause of &11 :anite things, Be nIlst b9.Ye p8t'feot

)tnowledge of them, insofar as tho7 are partioipations in Bie OWn
being.

Thus to

Spltak

of God as partioipating in the fom of anoth-

e.r being is more o.r less a

wa.:v

of speaking that bas been de.l"ivsd

f.rom finite th1ngs, and oannot rrean that the.re 1s a.n:v .real depend ..
enoe of God on vche.t Be knows in the "p.reparato.ry phases" 0: knowledge: because Be already possesses tm cba.raotG1"1stloa of the
things !fs knows, God is not .reduced from potential to aotual knowl~dge.
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E. GaD'S RELIGIOUS VALUE

Di..rtsbo.rne states that a completel.1 n.on.....relati'Ve

God

cannot

fulfill tbe asptratlons of the .t'elig1OD.s pt.rson; unless GOd can

re spend sens1 tll'e~7 to men ( that 1s, have the pot enol" of "sensl t1ve
response to

l1tflli' )'.

He is less than .re11g100.sl7 pa.rfeetl

Asm.u.-&noe that, at worst'. our slme.rel.r right efforts
will, in the long run, howeve.r distMt, produce on tbe
average more goOd than our 1nslnoe.re ~ penel'sely motJ:rateil actions, we must have. Thus omnipotenoe in the
fom of a general prov1d entia]. tendenoy fa'Vo.r1ng the
good and able to gua.,ra.ntee it a. minimum Of pe1"sistenoe
throuSh all future time a.nswel's to a genuine spi.r1tual
need. But fol' omnipotenoe whioh gua~nteea the exa.ot
deg.ree ana tbe last detail of future goods there is not
only no need but a.lso no possible plaoe in an ethioally
signifioant wo.rld·.13
This genuine spi.rltual need oan thus be filled only if God is a
llim1 ted being and so able to .respond to our goot! and bad aots.

In o.rltloism of th1a. we ooUld aooept Bartshor.ne's statement
that knowledge that our sincerely .right effo.rts w11l produce more

good than evil 1s neoeseazy 12'1 an ethioally signifioant world (although we might well ask, "Good tor whom?"

Is 1t neoesS8ZY that

the good involved be anything othez than the perfeotion. 1n some

pna::rmet.r. of the one perfo.rm1ng the good aot?)

\1e

oan ruther agree

that we want suoh a wo.rld, and that suoh 1s possible if God is as
Hartshorne says.

But we mast make two additional statements:
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i,rst, we know f.rom the p.roof for God's e:riatenae that He 1s not
fin1te, and that the,refore the desil'e far an ethioally signifioant
0.1'14 mst be .reoonoiled with this faot; seoond, God's infinity in
the ordez- of existence does not nonasei tate Ble "gua.rs.nteeing the
%aet deg,ree and

last detail of future goode."

Both statements are 3ustified by these

consl~arations.

Barts

o,rne's identification of an infinite God With a proVida.r-of-all-

etal1s is based on the assumption that if God can do all things,
e oan do nothing.

That is, it p.llesupposes that if GOd bas intin-

ts power, He must ileny othe.r beings the exe.roise of any pow8l'
hatsOEtver (J.n this case, the power of t.ree wl11).

But it men a.re

(that we a,re seems mol'e a natte.r of oocperienoe than the out ..
ome of all1

demonst~ation).

they themselves a.re

thaze is no inoonsistency in sayiq

~esponslble

fez their good and ertl aots,

nd the oOllSequenoes flovi1ng f.rom them, anc1 sa,vins that God is all

owel'ful.

That Be could
•

cont~ol eve~~

detail of future 9yents

questioned; t:t.t He does not do so di.reotly,

OJ:' wi thout

he instrumental!t,- of finite things, is oontradioted byou.r expel'

enoe of out'selves as fzee.
oW9l'ful, men a.re tl."ee.

These two facts us lalol'1lH God is all ...

Difficulties have su.rel,- been plentiful in

the e:xploration of tho state of atfa.1rs which

J:'9sul ts

from these

wo faots, but positing one does not necessitate deX11ins the other.

f, on the other hand, we adopt Hartshorne's extreme position that
od's omnipotence means the end of fl'ee will (this does seem to be

one yalid way of lnierpretlng Bls omnipotenoe). we ought to accept
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a fin!. te God in orasr to retain an ethioally signifioant world, onE
in whioh froe will oan effeotive1y ope.rate.

But suoh a prooedue

imp1ias that we have taken God's infinity as a postulate and not
as a f&ot; if it is taken

QS

a faot, snd troe will not dented, the

10gioal oonsequenoe ls the .rejeotion of the interpretation of omni.
potence as denying t.ree will.

If the ....e a1"G other possible inter-

pretations of omnipoteme. these ought to be e;p:am1.ned.

To erlend

Ha.l'tshorm's pt"ooe{llll"e. we might deo1de that such omnlpotenoe as

woula elfclutfefree wSll 1s more desirable than an ethioa.lly signif"
ioant world, anit thus deny free will.

A htnnan1.st. such as Ral"ts ..

horne, will of oourse deoiile in favol.' of free will, a "worshipper
of pow(.u!t against it.

But the actual facts are that God. can do eJJ

thl:nes andtbat men al.'e free; nei thOl.' oan be denied if we want to
keep on talk1ng about the real world. 14
A m6amn8:f'ul metaphysios ana philosoph-v of God are posslblG li
reality 113 oonaitlere« from the viewpoint of existenoe.

Hartshorne

seems to fall short of this: hie philosophY. in its origins. 1s an
a ttempt to make coa11 ty fully Tnea.ningM in the faoe of r.n appareni
laok of this very quall ty.

The means ohosen for aooomplish1ng

th1~

task. u.n:i!ortmls to 11, is the aooeptanoe of an a.vowed hypothaei s on
tho sconntls that the non-fIJ.Ooeptanoe of this hypothesiS would destroy the
....

u*.~

....

of human life.

v~.ltle
If

If..

,

,.

The alternative we have proposed to
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;panpsych1am and panentheism floes not banish myste.ry f.rom those

a.reas of expe.rienoe which Hartshorne thinks should be non-m.vater~ous.

but, as we have tried to show, a lmaningf1l1 meta.physios need

rl.ot be

0.

.ra.tionallstio metaphlrs1os.

In oonclusion, we can exp.ress ou.r ag.reement with John '[fild t 13
3udgment on B'a.rtshorl'le's ph110aopbzt of Goih
Even though we cannot acoept ltr. ltat'tsho.rne's answer,

whioh would seem to involve tbe elimination of Deity,
we must be g.rateful to him fo.r .raising these cruoia.l
questions once nlOH in a. nanner whloh is both sharp
a.nd penet.ratlllBf and whioh (Ulm.
.. ot help but lead to
much needed fu.rihe.r amlysls.J.f)
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